Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg Publications

We study the optimal design of trade and industrial policy when governments pursue environmental objectives alongside traditional national welfare. Motivated by the global transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and growing concerns about competitiveness, resilience, and the environment, we develop a framework in which policymakers choose tariffs and domestic production subsidies to maximize national welfare, defined as the sum of consumer surplus, domestic profits, environmental benefits, and tariff revenue net of subsidies. We combine a theoretical model of differentiated-product oligopoly with a structural demand model estimated using vehicle-level data from 13 countries during 2004-2023 that together account for the vast majority of global EV sales. Our central finding is that the optimal policy combines a moderate tariff on imported EVs with a subsidy to domestic EV production financed through tariff revenue. This policy substantially outperforms both outright protectionism and laissez-faire. Relative to current policies, it preserves consumer access to affordable EVs, accelerates fleet electrification, supports domestic producers, and remains budget-neutral. For the United States, the optimal policy more than doubles EV market share, generates over $45 billion in annual welfare gains, and avoids approximately 95 million tons of lifetime CO2 emissions. A key mechanism underlying these results is the pass-through of tariffs and subsidies to prices, which depends critically on demand curvature, product substitution, and market structure. More broadly, our results suggest that effective industrial policy requires careful attention to market structure and country-specific conditions, balancing consumer, producer, fiscal, and environmental objectives rather than adhering to ideological prescriptions.

We examine the effects of international trade in the presence of a set of domestic distortions giving rise to informality, a prevalent phenomenon in developing countries. In our quantitative model, the informal sector arises from burdensome taxes and regulations that are imperfectly enforced by the government. In equilibrium, smaller, less productive firms face fewer distortions than larger, more productive ones, potentially leading to substantial misallocation. We show that in settings with a large informal sector, the gains from trade are significantly amplified, as reductions in trade barriers imply a reallocation of resources from initially less distorted to more distorted firms. We confirm findings from earlier reduced‐form studies that the informal sector mitigates the impact of negative labor demand shocks on unemployment. Nonetheless, the informal sector can exacerbate the adverse real income effects of economic downturns, amplifying misallocation. Last, our research sheds light on the relationship between trade openness and cross‐firm wage inequality.

Since the late 1980s, extreme poverty has declined sharply, life expectancy and schooling have increased, and electoral democracy has expanded. However poverty reduction has slowed in recent years, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic, amid intensifying conflict, fragility, climate risks, democratic backsliding, and the erosion of global trends—including trade integration and geopolitical stability—that once supported growth. These dynamics raise three interrelated questions: what barriers impede further progress; where will future growth in lower-income countries come from; and how can growth be broadly shared. Taking stock of 15 chapters forthcoming in Volume 6 of the Handbook of Development Economics, we discuss how external conditions, state capacity and policy choices shape development; analyze the shifting growth drivers, including trade, technology and the rise of services; discuss persistent inequality and distributional tensions; and conjecture that investing in institutions and people pays off.

Globally women’s labor force participation lags that of men and women, on average, have lower labor market earnings than men. Does economic growth reduce gender disparities in labor market outcomes between women and men? Conversely, do gender inequalities in the labor market impede growth? To inform these questions, we conduct two analyses. First, we estimate regressions using harmonized data on gender gaps in a range of labor market outcomes from 153 countries spanning two decades (1998-2018). Second, we conduct a systematic review of the recent economics literature on gender gaps in labor markets, examining 16 journals over 21 years. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that growth is not a panacea. The relationship between growth and labor market gaps is mixed, and results vary by specification. This result reflects, in part, the gendered nature of structural transformation, in which growth leads men to transition from agriculture to industry and services while many women exit the labor force. Disparities in hours worked and wages persist despite growth, and heterogeneity in trends and levels between regions highlight the importance of local institutions. Newly harmonized microdata further show substantial heterogeneity by education level and marriage status. To better understand whether gender inequalities impeded growth, we explore a nascent literature that shows that reducing gender gaps in labor markets increases aggregate productivity. Our broader review highlights how traditional explanations for gender differences do not adequately explain existing gaps and how policy responses need to be sensitive to the changing nature of economic growth. We conclude by posing open questions for future research.

This paper revisits the relationship between international trade, trade policy, and development in light of the structural, policy, and geopolitical shifts that have transformed globalization over the past decade. While trade has historically supported development through both static and dynamic channels, we argue that the latter—those inducing structural transformation and institutional change—have been far more consequential for long-run development. Through access to global markets, participation in global value chains, and knowledge and technology transfers, and by providing an anchor for reform, trade and trade agreements have contributed to productivity gains, technological progress, quality and skill upgrading, and institutional change in many low- and middle-income countries. Yet, the conditions that enabled these effects—technologically driven declines in transportation and communication costs, fragmentation of the production process, liberal trade regimes, multilateralism and geopolitical stability—are changing. Automation, digitization, climate change, the return of industrial policy in advanced economies, and the rise of geopolitical rivalry are reshaping the global trade environment. In this new context, the scope for replicating past export-led growth successes is unlikely as two key growth mechanisms, access to the lucrative markets of advanced economies and knowledge sharing, are under threat. We discuss whether trade in services and the green transition may offer new opportunities, emphasizing that future prospects will depend on policy choices in large economies and the adaptability of developing countries.

The extent to which women participate in the labor market varies greatly across the globe. If such differences reflect distortions that women face in accessing good jobs, they can reduce economic activity through a misallocation of talent. In this paper, we build on Hsieh et al. (2019) to provide a methodology to quantify these productivity consequences. The index we propose, the "Global Gender Distortions Index (GGDI)", measures the losses in aggregate productivity that gender-based misallocation imposes. Our index allows us to separately identify labor demand distortions (e.g., discrimination in hiring for formal jobs) from labor supply distortions (e.g., frictions that discourage women’s labor force participation) and can be computed using data on labor income and job types. Our methodology also highlights an important distinction between welfare-relevant misallocation and the consequences on aggregate GDP if misallocation arises between market work and non-market activities. To showcase the versatility of our index, we analyze gender misallocation within countries over time, across countries over the development spectrum, and across local labor markets within countries. We find that misallocation is substantial and that demand distortions account for most of the productivity losses.

We develop a framework for quantifying barriers to labor force participation (LFP) and entrepreneurship faced by women in India. We find substantial barriers to LFP, and higher costs of expanding businesses through hiring workers for women entrepreneurs. However, there is one area where female entrepreneurs have an advantage: the hiring of female workers. We show that this is not driven by the sectoral composition of female employment. Consistent with this pattern, policies promoting female entrepreneurship can significantly increase female LFP even without explicitly targeting female LFP. Counterfactual simulations indicate that removing all excess barriers faced by women entrepreneurs would substantially increase the fraction of female‐owned firms, female LFP, earnings, and generate substantial gains for the economy. These gains are due to higher LFP, higher real wages and profits, and reallocation: low productivity male‐owned firms previously sheltered from female competition are replaced by higher productivity female‐owned firms previously excluded from the economy.

The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many "bystander" countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding the United States and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-Chinese tariffs identify whether a country's exports complement or substitute the United States or China and its supply curve's slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) the United States and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war.