This paper studies school choice and information frictions in Haiti. Through a randomized control trial, we assess the impact of disclosing school-level test score information on learning outcomes, prices, and market shares. We find evidence that in markets where information was disclosed, students attending private schools increased test scores. The results also suggest private schools with higher baseline test scores increased their market share as well as their fees when the disclosure policy is implemented. While prices and test scores were not significantly correlated in the baseline survey, they exhibited a significant and positive correlation in treatment markets after information disclosure. These results underscore the potential of information provision to enhance market efficiency and improve children’s welfare in context such as Haiti.
This paper studies school choice and information frictions in Haiti. Through a randomized control trial, we assess the impact of disclosing school-level test score information on learning outcomes, prices, and market shares. We find evidence that in markets where information was disclosed, students attending private schools increased test scores. The results also suggest private schools with higher baseline test scores increased their market share as well as their fees when the disclosure policy is implemented. While prices and test scores were not significantly correlated in the baseline survey, they exhibited a significant and positive correlation in treatment markets after information disclosure. These results underscore the potential of information provision to enhance market efficiency and improve children’s welfare in context such as Haiti.
Poor entrepreneurs must frequently choose between business investment and children's education. To examine this trade-off, we exploit experimental variation in short-run microenterprise growth among a sample of Indian households and track schooling and business out-comes over eleven years. Treated households, who experience higher initial microenterprise growth, are on average one-third more likely to send children to college. However, educational investment and schooling gains are concentrated among literate-parent households, whose enterprises eventually stagnate. In contrast, illiterate-parent households experience long-run business gains but declines in children's education. Our findings suggest that microenterprise growth has the potential to reduce relative intergenerational educational mobility.
Access to smartphones and mobile internet is increasingly necessary to participate in the modern economy. Yet women significantly lag men in digital access, especially in lower-income settings with gender gaps that span other dimensions - and where digital gaps threaten to deepen existing analog inequities. We study the short- and long-term effects of a large-scale state-sponsored program in India that aimed to close digital gender gaps by transferring free smartphones to women while constructing 4G towers to bring rural areas online. The program was well implemented, reversing gender gaps in smartphone ownership in the short run. However, many women lost ownership and gender gaps in use quickly worsened as men made use of the new phones. Nearly 5 years after the program began, we find limited evidence of persistent effects across a range of outcomes, including phone ownership and use, gender norms, access to information, and local economic activity, although we do find some evidence of sectoral reallocation in the labor market. Despite widespread increase in smartphone adoption across households, digital gender gaps persist and were not affected by the program. Our findings suggest that in gender-unequal, resource-constrained settings, addressing affordability alone may not close digital gender gaps.
Poor entrepreneurs must frequently choose between business investment and children's education. To examine this trade-off, we exploit experimental variation in short-run microenterprise growth among a sample of Indian households and track schooling and business out-comes over eleven years. Treated households, who experience higher initial microenterprise growth, are on average one-third more likely to send children to college. However, educational investment and schooling gains are concentrated among literate-parent households, whose enterprises eventually stagnate. In contrast, illiterate-parent households experience long-run business gains but declines in children's education. Our findings suggest that microenterprise growth has the potential to reduce relative intergenerational educational mobility.
A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue- optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off platform. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers.
The extent to which women participate in the labor market and have access to formal employment differs greatly across Indian states. In this paper we build on the methodology developed by Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow (2019) to estimate the productivity consequences of such differences. Using rich microdata on occupational sorting and earnings, our theory allows to separately identify labor demand distortions (e.g., discrimination in hiring for formal jobs) from labor supply distortions (e.g., frictions that discourage women’s labor force participation). We find that both demand distortions and supply distortions are negatively related to state-level economic development. Equalizing distortions across Indian states could raise state-level productivity by up to 15%.
This paper presents a model of consumption behavior that explains the presence of “wealthy hand-to-mouth” consumers using a mechanism that differs from those analyzed previously. We show that a two-asset model with temptation preferences generates a demand for commitment and thus illiquidity, leading to hand-to-mouth behavior even when liquid assets deliver higher returns than illiquid assets. This preference for illiquidity has important implications for consumption behavior and for fiscal stimulus policies. Our model matches the recent empirical evidence that Marginal Propensity to Consume remain high even for large income shocks, suggesting a larger response to targeted fiscal stimulus than previously believed.
Wealth accumulation is critical for advancing women's and men's economic opportunities, and yet is understudied in developing countries. Leveraging new, nationally-representative, cross-country comparable surveys where men and women self-reported on their personal asset ownership, we show that individual-level wealth inequality is significantly higher vis-à-vis comparators based on per capita household consumption expenditure, and per capita household wealth. Intra-household wealth inequality explains about 12–30 percent of overall wealth inequality, depending on the country context. The analysis further demonstrates how survey design choices, in particular respondent selection, matter for individual wealth inequality estimates.
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.
We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges’ (non)participation in Chile’s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.
On the basis of a randomized controlled trial, we evaluate a scholarship program in Mexico, Programa de Becas Educación Media Superior (PROBEMS), aimed at improving graduation rates and test scores among upper secondary school students from poor backgrounds. We find that, on average, the program has no effect on either graduation rates or math and Spanish test scores. We point to two possible reasons for this failure: (i) the program was badly targeted, with many of the recipients being from less disadvantaged families than intended; and (ii) the prior academic achievement of those eligible was often insufficient for successful completion of the academic requirements of upper secondary school. This points to accumulated achievement deficits that could be addressed by interventions targeting learning at an earlier stage.