Publications

Childcare services can offer an opportunity for women to develop their careers and increase household income. At the same time, it can affect the development of children, depending on the quality of care. We first develop a collective model of the household as a conceptual framework to show how improving the availability of childcare can affect mothers’ labor market opportunities and earnings and how it can affect child development. We then review the literature on the effects of childcare on the employment and earnings of women and on child development. Childcare can increase mothers’ employment. However, limited work opportunities or strict norms against maternal work can keep mothers out of the labor force. When other family members provide care, childcare can free these caregivers to work or attend school. When studies measure the impact on child development, the results are mixed and depend on both context and quality of provision.

We study rainmaking as an instrumental religious belief. We present a model in which a religious leader tries to persuade people to believe. Praying for rain can persuade only where the hazard of rainfall during a dry spell is increasing over time, so that prayer is most likely to succeed when people most want rain. We present evidence from prayers for rain in Murcia, Spain, where the hazard rate is increasing, that the church’s prayers for rain predict rainfall over two centuries. To generalize this finding, we gather an original data set of whether ethnic groups around the world traditionally prayed for rain. We find that ethnic groups facing an increasing rainfall hazard are 47% more likely to pray for rain, consistent with our model’s prediction that societies are more likely to pray for rain where prayer is persuasive.

Economic development is often conceived as structural transformation and migration out of rural agriculture (Lewis, 1954; Fei & Ranis, 1964). Understanding development therefore requires us to identify how rural economies transform in response to emigration. We study how international migration reshapes domestic economic activity in origin households using a randomized visa lottery that gave Bangladeshi men job opportunities in Malaysia. Winning the lottery raises total household income through remittances, but income earned in Bangladesh declines due to contractions in nonfarm business activity. In contrast, crop income remains stable despite large reductions in agricultural input expenditures, because farming gets delegated through land rental markets. We identify a “supervision constraint” that explains why households divest from nonfarm business activity. The key input that is lost through male migration is not land, labor, or physical capital, but “management capacity”.

Seasonal migration is a common strategy to mitigate rural seasonal deprivation, but migrants need to remit money during the lean season to family members facing food shortages. We observe counterintuitively low remittances in rural Nepal during periods of seasonal hunger, and migrants return with remittances later during harvest when food is relatively abundant. To indirectly overcome this apparent constraint in remittance timing, we provide a $90 consumption loan to randomly selected rural households during the pre‐harvest lean season. Loan‐recipient households increase pre‐harvest investments in fertilizer and time spent working on their own farm, smooth consumption, and save more of their migration income to bring it back home. Food security, subjective well‐being, rice harvest, and revenues improve. Ninety‐eight percent of beneficiaries repay the loan with the increased harvest‐period remittance. In a two‐period model of household decision making, we show that remittance frictions—a market failure—are necessary to qualitatively match our experimental results.

Do elite colleges help talented students join the social elite or help incumbent elites retain their positions? We combine intergenerationally linked data from Chile with a regression discontinuity design to show that, looking across generations, elite colleges do both. Lower-status individuals who gain admission to elite college programs transform their children's social environment. Children become more likely to attend high-status private schools and colleges and to live near and befriend high-status peers. In contrast, academic achievement is unaffected. Simulations combining descriptive and quasi-experimental findings show that elite colleges tighten the link between social and human capital while decreasing intergenerational social mobility.

We study the optimal design of trade and industrial policy when governments pursue environmental objectives alongside traditional national welfare. Motivated by the global transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and growing concerns about competitiveness, resilience, and the environment, we develop a framework in which policymakers choose tariffs and domestic production subsidies to maximize national welfare, defined as the sum of consumer surplus, domestic profits, environmental benefits, and tariff revenue net of subsidies. We combine a theoretical model of differentiated-product oligopoly with a structural demand model estimated using vehicle-level data from 13 countries during 2004-2023 that together account for the vast majority of global EV sales. Our central finding is that the optimal policy combines a moderate tariff on imported EVs with a subsidy to domestic EV production financed through tariff revenue. This policy substantially outperforms both outright protectionism and laissez-faire. Relative to current policies, it preserves consumer access to affordable EVs, accelerates fleet electrification, supports domestic producers, and remains budget-neutral. For the United States, the optimal policy more than doubles EV market share, generates over $45 billion in annual welfare gains, and avoids approximately 95 million tons of lifetime CO2 emissions. A key mechanism underlying these results is the pass-through of tariffs and subsidies to prices, which depends critically on demand curvature, product substitution, and market structure. More broadly, our results suggest that effective industrial policy requires careful attention to market structure and country-specific conditions, balancing consumer, producer, fiscal, and environmental objectives rather than adhering to ideological prescriptions.

This paper studies how the risk of hold-up affects procurement. I use data on the universe of solar power auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of counterparty risk, because solar plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions intermediated by either risky states themselves or the trusted central government. I find that the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar prices by 10%. This risk premium sharply reduces investment, because demand for green energy is elastic. Contract intermediation by the central government eliminates the counterparty risk premium.

This article studies the effects of automation in a task-based economy in which some jobs pay workers rents—wages above workers' outside options. We show that automation targets high-rent tasks, dissipating rents, amplifying wage losses, and reducing within-group wage dispersion in exposed groups. This form of rent dissipation is inefficient and offsets the productivity gains from automation. Using U.S. data from 1980 to 2016, we find evidence of sizable rent dissipation and reduced within-group wage dispersion due to automation. Automation accounts for 52% of the increase in between-group inequality since 1980, with rent dissipation explaining one-fifth of this total. Our estimates imply that inefficient rent dissipation has offset 60%–90% of the productivity gains from automation over this period.

We document employment preferences of workers at the margin of informality using open-ended questions and discrete choice experiments in Brazil's largest favela complex. Stated preferences emphasize pay and tangible job attributes rather than meaning or purpose. Stated complaints center on management, customers, and inflexible schedules. Workers exhibit high willingness to pay for unemployment insurance, parental leave, and learning opportunities, but none for termination notice or shorter commutes. We find larger willingness to accept to forgo amenities than willingness to pay to obtain them, consistent with preference-based sorting or endowment effects.

We study the large-scale experimental rollout of a platform that reduced search and matchingfrictions in Ugandan agricultural markets by connecting buyers and sellers. Market integrationimproved substantially: trade increased and price gaps fell. Interpreting the experiment througha trade model, we estimate treatment effects accounting for equilibrium changes that impactcontrol markets. The intervention reduced fixed trade costs by 20% and increased trade flowsbetween treated markets by 7% and across all markets by 1%. Scale economies shaped engagement:few farmers used the platform, but equilibrium price convergence from improved arbitrage bylarger traders passed through to farm revenue.

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) identifies an annual biodiversity funding gap of $700 billion. Given insufficient public funds, GBF Target 19 seeks to leverage private finance to fill this funding gap. Yet viable and scalable private conservation strategies remain uncommon (1). Here, we provide evidence that changes in local biodiversity can affect municipal borrowing costs using a case study of how a sudden decrease in bat populations, which weakens natural pest-control services provided to farms, affects the finances of US rural county governments. This connection between biodiversity and government borrowing costs creates a promising pathway for private conservation investment. Profit-seeking investors may strategically invest in a county’s municipal bonds when valuations are likely to change owing to shifts in the condition of local biodiversity. This investment strategy may allow investors to monetize conservation efforts by aligning their bond investment strategy with conservation actions.

We examine the effects of international trade in the presence of a set of domestic distortions giving rise to informality, a prevalent phenomenon in developing countries. In our quantitative model, the informal sector arises from burdensome taxes and regulations that are imperfectly enforced by the government. In equilibrium, smaller, less productive firms face fewer distortions than larger, more productive ones, potentially leading to substantial misallocation. We show that in settings with a large informal sector, the gains from trade are significantly amplified, as reductions in trade barriers imply a reallocation of resources from initially less distorted to more distorted firms. We confirm findings from earlier reduced‐form studies that the informal sector mitigates the impact of negative labor demand shocks on unemployment. Nonetheless, the informal sector can exacerbate the adverse real income effects of economic downturns, amplifying misallocation. Last, our research sheds light on the relationship between trade openness and cross‐firm wage inequality.

Since the late 1980s, extreme poverty has declined sharply, life expectancy and schooling have increased, and electoral democracy has expanded. However poverty reduction has slowed in recent years, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic, amid intensifying conflict, fragility, climate risks, democratic backsliding, and the erosion of global trends—including trade integration and geopolitical stability—that once supported growth. These dynamics raise three interrelated questions: what barriers impede further progress; where will future growth in lower-income countries come from; and how can growth be broadly shared. Taking stock of 15 chapters forthcoming in Volume 6 of the Handbook of Development Economics, we discuss how external conditions, state capacity and policy choices shape development; analyze the shifting growth drivers, including trade, technology and the rise of services; discuss persistent inequality and distributional tensions; and conjecture that investing in institutions and people pays off.

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and items, even with a continuum of buyer values. The seller optimally pools buyer values and reduces product variety to minimize informational rents. We show that value pooling is optimal even for finite value distributions if their entropy exceeds a critical threshold. We also provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal menu restricts offering to a single item.

We investigate the efficiency of a market relative to a non-market institution—an auction relative to a quota—as allocation mechanisms in the presence of frictions. We use data from water markets in southeastern Spain and explore a specific change in the institutions to allocate water. On the one hand, frictions arose because poor farmers were liquidity constrained. On the other hand, farmers who were part of the wealthy elite were not liquidity constrained. We estimate a structural dynamic demand model by taking advantage of the fact that water demand for both types of farmers is determined by the technological constraint imposed by the crop’s production function. This approach allows us to differentiate liquidity constraints from unobserved heterogeneity. We show that the institutional change from an auction to a quota increased total efficiency for the farmers considered. Welfare increased by 23.4 real pesetas per farmer per tree, a 6 % increase in total production relative to the market.