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Kelsey Jack Publications

Discussion Paper
Abstract

Economic development relies on and transforms the environment. The transformation is evident in the poor environmental quality in many developing countries. For example, air quality in Southeast Asia is three times worse than in the United States, in sub-Saharan Africa four times worse and in South Asia more than six times worse. We model how environmental quality affects health, productivity and well-being and how individuals privately adapt to environmental hazards. We also model how collective action and formal regulation contribute to environmental quality. We draw three main findings from a review of empirical research on these mechanisms. First, individual adaptation to environmental hazards is both inadequate as a remedy and inefficiently low. Second, collective action, without the state, to manage resources or address externalities has been outstripped by the scale of environmental problems. Third, state action through formal regulation works better than it looks. Many formal regulations are coarse, poorly targeted and inefficient, but nonetheless yield benefits in excess of their costs.

American Economic Review: Insights
Abstract

We test whether payments for ecosystem services (PES) can curb the highly polluting practice of crop residue burning in India. Standard PES contracts pay participants after verification that they met a proenvironment condition (clearing fields without burning). We randomize paying a portion of the money up front and unconditionally to address liquidity constraints and farmer distrust, which may undermine the standard contract's effectiveness. Incorporating partial up-front payment into the contract increases compliance by 10 percentage points, which is corroborated by satellite-based burning measurements. The cost per life saved is $3,600–$5,400. The standard PES contract has no effect on burning.