We test whether payments for ecosystem services (PES) can curb the highly polluting practice of crop residue burning in India. Standard PES contracts pay participants after verification that they met a proenvironment condition (clearing fields without burning). We randomize paying a portion of the money up front and unconditionally to address liquidity constraints and farmer distrust, which may undermine the standard contract's effectiveness. Incorporating partial up-front payment into the contract increases compliance by 10 percentage points, which is corroborated by satellite-based burning measurements. The cost per life saved is $3,600–$5,400. The standard PES contract has no effect on burning.
Access to smartphones and mobile internet is increasingly necessary to participate in the modern economy. Yet women significantly lag men in digital access, especially in lower-income settings with gender gaps that span other dimensions - and where digital gaps threaten to deepen existing analog inequities. We study the short- and long-term effects of a large-scale state-sponsored program in India that aimed to close digital gender gaps by transferring free smartphones to women while constructing 4G towers to bring rural areas online. The program was well implemented, reversing gender gaps in smartphone ownership in the short run. However, many women lost ownership and gender gaps in use quickly worsened as men made use of the new phones. Nearly 5 years after the program began, we find limited evidence of persistent effects across a range of outcomes, including phone ownership and use, gender norms, access to information, and local economic activity, although we do find some evidence of sectoral reallocation in the labor market. Despite widespread increase in smartphone adoption across households, digital gender gaps persist and were not affected by the program. Our findings suggest that in gender-unequal, resource-constrained settings, addressing affordability alone may not close digital gender gaps.
Poor entrepreneurs must frequently choose between business investment and children's education. To examine this trade-off, we exploit experimental variation in short-run microenterprise growth among a sample of Indian households and track schooling and business out-comes over eleven years. Treated households, who experience higher initial microenterprise growth, are on average one-third more likely to send children to college. However, educational investment and schooling gains are concentrated among literate-parent households, whose enterprises eventually stagnate. In contrast, illiterate-parent households experience long-run business gains but declines in children's education. Our findings suggest that microenterprise growth has the potential to reduce relative intergenerational educational mobility.
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.
Does economic growth close labor market-linked gender gaps that disadvantage women? Conversely, do gender inequalities in the labor market impede growth? To inform these questions, we conduct two analyses. First, we estimate regressions using data on gender gaps in a range of labor market outcomes from 153 countries spanning two decades (1998-2018). Second, we conduct a systematic review of the recent economics literature on gender gaps in labor markets, examining 16 journals over 21 years. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that growth is not a panacea. While economic gender gaps have narrowed and growth is associated with gender gap closures specifically in incidence of paid work, the relationship between growth and labor market gaps is otherwise mixed, and results vary by specification. This result reflects, in part, the gendered nature of structural transformation, in which growth leads men to transition from agriculture to industry and services while many women exit the labor force. Disparities in hours worked and wages persist despite growth, and heterogeneity in trends and levels between regions highlight the importance of local institutions. To better understand whether gender inequalities impeded growth, we explore a nascent literature that shows that reducing gender gaps in labor markets increases aggregate productivity. Our broader review highlights how traditional explanations for gender differences do not adequately explain existing gaps and how policy responses need to be sensitive to the changing nature of economic growth. We conclude by posing open questions for future research.
Does a woman’s take-up of government benefits vary with her perception of how they will be shared within the household? Using randomized assignment to alternative information treatments, we examine this question in the context of Saudi women’s willingness to apply for unemployment assistance (Hafiz). We compare the take-up among women who receive no program information to three groups: those who receive information on program eligibility conditions (Eligibility group) and those who receive additional information that their registration status is broadly confidential (Privacy group) or that they fully control registering and accessing benefits (Agency group). Three months later, the treatments, on average, doubled Hafiz applications, with the treatment impacts largest for the Agency group. Women from poorer households and married women are most responsive to the Agency and Privacy interventions respectively. These findings are consistent with collective household bargaining models where family members’ spending preferences differ; we predict larger treatment impacts when there is more competition for resources.
Time use data facilitate understanding of labor supply, especially for women who often undertake unpaid care and home production. Although assisted diary-based time use surveys are suitable for low-literacy populations, they are costly and rarely used. We create a low-cost, scalable alternative that captures contextually-determined broad time categories; here, allocations across market work, household labor, and leisure. Using fewer categories and larger time intervals takes 33% less time than traditional modules. Field experiments show the module measures average time across the broader categories as well as the traditional approach, particularly for our target female population. The module can also capture multitasking for a specific category of interest. Its shortcomings are short duration activity capture and the need for careful category selection. The module’s brevity and low cost make it a viable method to use in household and labor force surveys, facilitating tracking of work and leisure patterns as economies develop.
Background:India's abrupt nationwide Covid-19 lockdown internally displaced millions of migrant workers, who returned to distant rural homes. Documenting their labour market reintegration is a critical aspect of understanding the economic costs of the pandemic for India's poor. In a country marked by low and declining female labor force participation, identifying gender gaps in labor market reintegration – as a marker of both women's vulnerability at times of crisis and setbacks in women's agency – is especially important. Yet most studies of pandemic-displaced internal migrants in India are small, rely on highly selected convenience samples, and lack a gender focus.
Methods: Beginning in April 2020 we enrolled roughly 4,600 displaced migrants who had, during the lockdown, returned to two of India's poorest states into a cohort observational study which tracked enrolees through July 2021. Survey respondents were randomly selected from the states’ official databases of return migrants, with sampling stratified by state and gender. 85% of enrollees (3950) were working prior to the pandemic. Our difference-in-means analysis uses three survey waves conducted in July to August 2020, January to March 2021, and June to July 2021. Our analysis focuses on a balanced panel of 1780 previously working enrollees (the 45% of respondents present in the first wave that also participated in the subsequent two survey rounds). Primary outcomes of interest include labor market re-entry, earnings, and measures of vulnerability by gender.
Findings: Before the March 2020 national lockdown, 98% (95% CI [97,99]) of workers were employed in the non-agricultural sector. In July 2020, one month after the end of the lockdown, incomes plummet, with both genders earning roughly 17% of their pre-pandemic incomes. 47% (95% CI [45,49]) were employed in agriculture and 37% (95% CI [35,39]) were unemployed. Remigration is critical to regaining income – by January 2021, male re-migrants report earnings on par with their pre-pandemic incomes, while men remaining in rural areas earn only 23% (95% CI [19,27]) of their pre-pandemic income. Remigration benefits women to a lesser extent – female re-migrants regain no more than 65% (95% CI [57,73]) of their pre-pandemic income at any point. Yet men and women struggle to remigrate throughout – by July 2021, no more than 63% (95% CI [60,66]) of men and 55% (95% CI [51,59]) of women had left their home villages since returning. Gender gaps in income recovery largely reflect higher rates of unemployment among women, both among those remaining in rural areas (9 percentage points (95% CI [6,13]) higher than men across waves) and among those who remigrate (13 percentage points (95% CI [9,17]) higher than men across waves). As a result, we observe gender gaps in well-being: relative to male counterparts, women across waves were 7 percentage points (95% CI [4,10]) more likely to report reduced consumption of essential goods and fared 6 percentage points (95% CI [4,7]) worse on a food insecurity index.
Interpretation: Displaced migrants of both genders experienced persistent hardships for over a year after the initial pandemic lockdown. Women fare worse, driven by both lower rates of remigration and lower rates of labor market re-entry both inside and outside home villages. Some women drop out of the labor force entirely, but most unemployed report seeking or being available to work. In short, pandemic-induced labor market displacement has far-reaching, long-term consequences for migrant workers, especially women.
Funding: Survey costs were funded by research grants from IZA/FCDO Gender, Growth, and Labour Markets in Low Income Countries Programme, J-PAL Jobs and Opportunity Initiative, and the Evidence-based Measures of Empowerment for Research on Gender Equality (EMERGE) program at University of California San Diego.