Market-based environmental regulations are seldom used in low-income countries, where pollution is highest but state capacity is often low. We collaborated with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) to design and experimentally evaluate the world’s first particulate-matter emissions market, which covered industrial plants in a large Indian city. There are three main findings. First, the market functioned well. Treatment plants, randomly assigned to the emissions market, traded permits to become significant net sellers or buyers. After trading, treatment plants held enough permits to cover their emissions 99% of the time, compared with just 66% compliance with standards under the command-and-control status quo. Second, treatment plants reduced pollution emissions, relative to control plants, by 20%–30%. Third, the market reduced abatement costs by an estimated 11%, holding constant emissions. This cost-savings estimate is based on plant-specific marginal cost curves that we estimate from the universe of bids to buy and sell permits in the market. The combination of pollution reductions and low costs imply that the emissions market has mortality benefits that exceed its costs by at least 25 times.
Market-based environmental regulations are seldom used in low-income countries, where pollution is highest but state capacity is often low. We collaborated with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) to design and experimentally evaluate the world’s first particulate-matter emissions market, which covered industrial plants in a large Indian city. There are three main findings. First, the market functioned well. Treatment plants, randomly assigned to the emissions market, traded permits to become significant net sellers or buyers. After trading, treatment plants held enough permits to cover their emissions 99% of the time, compared with just 66% compliance with standards under the command-and-control status quo. Second, treatment plants reduced pollution emissions, relative to control plants, by 20%–30%. Third, the market reduced abatement costs by an estimated 11%, holding constant emissions. This cost-savings estimate is based on plant-specific marginal cost curves that we estimate from the universe of bids to buy and sell permits in the market. The combination of pollution reductions and low costs imply that the emissions market has mortality benefits that exceed its costs by at least 25 times.
We test whether payments for ecosystem services (PES) can curb the highly polluting practice of crop residue burning in India. Standard PES contracts pay participants after verification that they met a proenvironment condition (clearing fields without burning). We randomize paying a portion of the money up front and unconditionally to address liquidity constraints and farmer distrust, which may undermine the standard contract's effectiveness. Incorporating partial up-front payment into the contract increases compliance by 10 percentage points, which is corroborated by satellite-based burning measurements. The cost per life saved is $3,600–$5,400. The standard PES contract has no effect on burning.
Access to smartphones and mobile internet is increasingly necessary to participate in the modern economy. Yet women significantly lag men in digital access, especially in lower-income settings with gender gaps that span other dimensions - and where digital gaps threaten to deepen existing analog inequities. We study the short- and long-term effects of a large-scale state-sponsored program in India that aimed to close digital gender gaps by transferring free smartphones to women while constructing 4G towers to bring rural areas online. The program was well implemented, reversing gender gaps in smartphone ownership in the short run. However, many women lost ownership and gender gaps in use quickly worsened as men made use of the new phones. Nearly 5 years after the program began, we find limited evidence of persistent effects across a range of outcomes, including phone ownership and use, gender norms, access to information, and local economic activity, although we do find some evidence of sectoral reallocation in the labor market. Despite widespread increase in smartphone adoption across households, digital gender gaps persist and were not affected by the program. Our findings suggest that in gender-unequal, resource-constrained settings, addressing affordability alone may not close digital gender gaps.
Poor entrepreneurs must frequently choose between business investment and children's education. To examine this trade-off, we exploit experimental variation in short-run microenterprise growth among a sample of Indian households and track schooling and business out-comes over eleven years. Treated households, who experience higher initial microenterprise growth, are on average one-third more likely to send children to college. However, educational investment and schooling gains are concentrated among literate-parent households, whose enterprises eventually stagnate. In contrast, illiterate-parent households experience long-run business gains but declines in children's education. Our findings suggest that microenterprise growth has the potential to reduce relative intergenerational educational mobility.
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.
Does economic growth close labor market-linked gender gaps that disadvantage women? Conversely, do gender inequalities in the labor market impede growth? To inform these questions, we conduct two analyses. First, we estimate regressions using data on gender gaps in a range of labor market outcomes from 153 countries spanning two decades (1998-2018). Second, we conduct a systematic review of the recent economics literature on gender gaps in labor markets, examining 16 journals over 21 years. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that growth is not a panacea. While economic gender gaps have narrowed and growth is associated with gender gap closures specifically in incidence of paid work, the relationship between growth and labor market gaps is otherwise mixed, and results vary by specification. This result reflects, in part, the gendered nature of structural transformation, in which growth leads men to transition from agriculture to industry and services while many women exit the labor force. Disparities in hours worked and wages persist despite growth, and heterogeneity in trends and levels between regions highlight the importance of local institutions. To better understand whether gender inequalities impeded growth, we explore a nascent literature that shows that reducing gender gaps in labor markets increases aggregate productivity. Our broader review highlights how traditional explanations for gender differences do not adequately explain existing gaps and how policy responses need to be sensitive to the changing nature of economic growth. We conclude by posing open questions for future research.
Does a woman’s take-up of government benefits vary with her perception of how they will be shared within the household? Using randomized assignment to alternative information treatments, we examine this question in the context of Saudi women’s willingness to apply for unemployment assistance (Hafiz). We compare the take-up among women who receive no program information to three groups: those who receive information on program eligibility conditions (Eligibility group) and those who receive additional information that their registration status is broadly confidential (Privacy group) or that they fully control registering and accessing benefits (Agency group). Three months later, the treatments, on average, doubled Hafiz applications, with the treatment impacts largest for the Agency group. Women from poorer households and married women are most responsive to the Agency and Privacy interventions respectively. These findings are consistent with collective household bargaining models where family members’ spending preferences differ; we predict larger treatment impacts when there is more competition for resources.