José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez Publications

We investigate the efficiency of a market relative to a non-market institution—an auction relative to a quota—as allocation mechanisms in the presence of frictions. We use data from water markets in southeastern Spain and explore a specific change in the institutions to allocate water. On the one hand, frictions arose because poor farmers were liquidity constrained. On the other hand, farmers who were part of the wealthy elite were not liquidity constrained. We estimate a structural dynamic demand model by taking advantage of the fact that water demand for both types of farmers is determined by the technological constraint imposed by the crop’s production function. This approach allows us to differentiate liquidity constraints from unobserved heterogeneity. We show that the institutional change from an auction to a quota increased total efficiency for the farmers considered. Welfare increased by 23.4 real pesetas per farmer per tree, a 6 % increase in total production relative to the market.

This paper presents the first numbers on Spanish migration to Spanish America for the colonial period (1492-1830). We analyze quantitative patterns, geographic origins and destinations, gender, and migrant human capital. Drawing on a wide array of primary and secondary sources, we provide the first comprehensive dataset covering for the entire colonial period. This dataset opens new avenues for research on migrant networks, elite formation, social mobility, and the links between migration and long-run economic development.

The Philippine Islands experienced two radically different colonial regimes: the Spanish Empire and the United States. These two regimes, however, had two points in common. First, both occupied the Philippines due to the islands' strategic location, and both were sorely disappointed by that decision. Second, both nations solved the "imperial trilemma" -- the trade-off between settlement, control, and economic exploitation -- by jettisoning metropolitan settlement and exploitation. Despite those similarities, however, the effects of the two regimes on the Philippines were radically different. The Philippines as we know it would not exist without the Spanish empire, whereas the long-term impacts of the American period (other than the English language) is at best unclear. The Americans under-resourced their reform efforts and sabotaged many of their own accomplishments in a rush to decolonize after 1935, for reasons of domestic American politics, not Filipino nationalism.

We study equilibria in static entry games with single-dimensional private information. Our framework embeds many models commonly used in applied work, allowing for firm heterogeneity and selective entry. We introduce the notion of strength, which summarizes a firm's ability to endure competition. In environments of applied interest, an equilibrium in which entry strategies are ordered according to the firms' strengths always exists. We call this equilibrium herculean. We derive simple and testable sufficient conditions guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness and, consequently, a unique counterfactual prediction.

We use data from marriage records in Murcia, Spain, in the eighteenth century to study the role of women in social mobility in the pre-modern era. Our measure of social standing is identification as a don or doña, an honorific denoting high, though not necessarily noble, status. We show that this measure, which is acquired over the lifecycle, shows gendered transmission patterns. In particular, same-sex transmission is stronger than opposite-sex, for both sons and daughters. The relative transmission from fathers versus mothers varies over the lifecycle, and grandparents may affect the status of their grandchildren.

For centuries, irrigation communities in south-eastern Spain were socially stable and economically efficient. In this article, we show how these self-governing institutions persisted by resolving conflicts over scarce resources with flexible punishment for water theft. We argue that variable penalties for violating irrigation rules provided social insurance to farmers during droughts. We develop a dynamic model in which judges trade off crime deterrence and social insurance, and test its predictions using a novel dataset on water theft in the self-governed irrigation community of Mula, Spain, from 1851 to 1948. For the same offence, we show that recidivists were punished more harshly than first-time offenders. When the defendant was wealthy, as indicated by the honorific title don, or the victim was poor, judgements were stricter.