We examine changes in inequality in socio-emotional skills very early in life in two British cohorts born 30 years apart. We construct comparable scales using two validated instruments for the measurement of child behaviour and identify two dimensions of socio-emotional skills: ‘internalising’ and ‘externalising’. Using recent methodological advances in factor analysis, we establish comparability in the inequality of these early skills across cohorts, but not in their average level. We document for the first time that inequality in socio-emotional skills has increased across cohorts, especially for boys and at the bottom of the distribution. We also formally decompose the sources of the increase in inequality and find that compositional changes explain half of the rise in inequality in externalising skills. On the other hand, the increase in inequality in internalising skills seems entirely driven by changes in returns to background characteristics. Lastly, we document that socio-emotional skills measured at an earlier age than in most of the existing literature are significant predictors of health and health behaviours. Our results show the importance of formally testing comparability of measurements to study skills differences across groups, and in general point to the role of inequalities in the early years for the accumulation of health and human capital across the life course.
We estimate production functions for cognition and health for children aged 1–12 in India, based on the Young Lives Survey. India has over 70 million children aged 0–5 who are at risk of developmental deficits. The inputs into the production functions include parental background, prior child cognition and health, and child investments, which are taken as endogenous. Estimation is based on a nonlinear factor model, based on multiple measurements for both inputs and child outcomes. Our results show an important effect of early health on child cognitive development, which then becomes persistent. Parental investments affect cognitive development at all ages, but more so for younger children. Investments also have an impact on health at early ages only.
This article studies the differential effect of targeting cash transfers to men or women on household expenditure on non-durables. We study a policy intervention in the Republic of North Macedonia that offers cash transfers to poor households, conditional on having their children attending secondary school. The recipient is randomised across municipalities, with payments targeted to either the mother or the father of the child. Targeting transfers to women increases the expenditure share on food by 4 to 5 percentage points. At low levels of food expenditure, there is a shift towards a more nutritious diet.
Can e-governance reforms improve government policy? By making information available on a real-time basis, information technologies may reduce the theft of public funds. We analyze a large field experiment and the nationwide scale-up of a reform to India's workfare program. Advance payments were replaced by "just-in-time" payments, triggered by e-invoicing, making it easier to detect misreporting. Leakages went down: program expenditures dropped by 24 percent, while employment slightly increased; there were fewer fake households in the official database; and program officials' personal wealth fell by 10 percent. However, payment delays increased. The nationwide scale-up resulted in a persistent 19 percent reduction in program expenditure.
Improving school quality with limited resources is a key issue of policy. This article uses a randomised controlled trial (RCT) to estimate the effectiveness of guided instruction methods as implemented in under-performing schools in Chile. The intervention improved performance substantially, and equally for boys and girls. However, the effect is mainly accounted for by children from relatively higher-income backgrounds. Basing our study on the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS) instrument, we document that the quality of teacher–student interactions is positively correlated with the performance of low-income students; however, the intervention did not affect these interactions. Guided instruction improves outcomes, but the challenge to reach the most deprived children remains.
The prevalence of vote-buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world; potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians, and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected. In this paper, we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability. Using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya, we find that vote payments reduce voters' willingness to hold politicians accountable: holding fixed politician identity, voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent-seeking, and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted. Unsurprisingly, the politician then engages in a higher level of rent-seeking. A simple model of multi-faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings.
We measure the impact of increasing integration between rural villages and outside labor markets. Seasonal flash floods cause exogenous and unpredictable loss of market access. We study the impact of new bridges that eliminate this risk. Identification exploits variation in riverbank characteristics that preclude bridge construction in some villages, despite similar need. We collect detailed annual household surveys over three years, and weekly telephone followups to study contemporaneous effects of flooding. Floods decrease labor market income by 18 percent when no bridge is present. Bridges eliminate this effect. The indirect effects on labor market choice, farm investment, and savings are quantitatively important and consistent with the predictions of a general equilibrium model in which farm investment is risky, and households manage labor market risk and agricultural risk simultaneously. In the calibrated model, the increase in consumption-equivalent welfare is substantially larger than the increase in income due to the ability to mitigate risk.
Markups vary systematically across firms and are a source of misallocation. This paper develops a tractable model of firm dynamics where firms' market power is endogenous and the distribution of markups emerges as an equilibrium outcome. Monopoly power is the result of a process of forward-looking, risky accumulation: firms invest in productivity growth to increase markups in their existing products but are stochastically replaced by more efficient competitors. Creative destruction therefore has pro-competitive effects because faster churn gives firms less time to accumulate market power. In an application to firm-level data from Indonesia, the model predicts that, relative to the United States, misallocation is more severe and firms are substantially smaller. To explain these patterns, the model suggests an important role for frictions that prevent existing firms from entering new markets. Differences in entry costs for new firms are less important.
We explore the implications of judicial learning for trade disputes through a model where both the initiation of disputes and the occurrence of rulings are endogenous, governments bargain “in the shadow of the law,” and the efficiency of the court increases with experience. Judicial learning can explain litigation on the equilibrium path, since going to court today implies future payoff gains for the governments. Our model predicts that where learning is present the likelihood of both disputes and rulings should tend to decrease with court experience. Using detailed data on WTO disputes, we find evidence consistent with significant judicial learning at the WTO, but this learning appears to be article-specific and disputant-specific, rather than general, in scope.
Recent studies find that observational returns to rural-urban migration are near zero in three developing countries. We revisit this result using panel tracking surveys from six countries, finding higher returns on average. We then interpret these returns in a multi-region Roy model with heterogeneity in migration costs. In the model, the observational return to migration confounds the urban premium and the individual benefits of migrants, and is not directly informative about the welfare gain from lowering migration costs. Patterns of regional heterogeneity in returns, and a comparison of experimental to observational returns, are consistent with the model’s predictions.
This paper uses a dataset from Tanzania with information on consumption, income, and income shocks within and across family networks. Crucially and uniquely, it also contains data on the degree of information existing between each pair of households within family networks. We use these data to construct a novel measure of the quality of information both at the level of household pairs and at the level of the network. We also note that the individual level measures can be interpreted as measures of network centrality. We study risk sharing within these networks and explore whether the rejection of perfect risk sharing that we observe can be related to our measures of information quality. We show that households within family networks with better information are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, we show that more central households within networks are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. These results have important implications for the characterisation of the empirical failure of the perfect risk-sharing hypothesis and point to the importance of information frictions.
The frictions that restrict migration are among the largest sources of inefficiency in the global economy. The first step in designing policies to address these frictions is to understand the fundamental forces that drive migration. However, the Roy model—the workhorse model of migration in economics—does a poor job of explaining many important features of this phenomenon. This limitation can be rectified by adding migrant networks to the Roy model. A rich qualitative literature in the social sciences has documented the role played by social networks in supporting migrants in their new locations. Economists have advanced this literature by identifying and quantifying the contribution of these networks to migration. Although much progress has been made over the past two decades, important gaps in the literature remain: migrant assimilation has received little theoretical or empirical attention, and a richer characterization of the social interactions that support these networks is needed to tie research on migration to the economic literature on networks.
Substantial research in development economics has highlighted the presence of weak institutions, market failures, and distortions in developing countries. Yet much of the knowledge generated in international trade comes from workhorse models that abstract from these frictions. This review summarizes the recent literature that assesses how these characteristics interact (or may interact) with trade reforms, resulting in different impacts in developing countries relative to what we would expect in developed countries. We discuss understudied areas that warrant further research.
Weak contract enforcement may reduce the efficiency of production in developing countries. I study how contract enforcement affects efficiency in procurement auctions for the largest power projects in India. I gather data on bidding and ex post contract renegotiation and find that the renegotiation of contracts in response to cost shocks is widespread, despite that bidders are allowed to index their bids to future costs like the price of coal. To study heterogeneity in bidding strategies, I construct a new measure of firm connectedness, based on whether a firm has been awarded coal concessions by the Government. Connected firms choose to index less of the value of their bids to coal prices and, through this strategy, expose themselves to cost shocks to induce renegotiation. I use a structural model of bidding in a scoring auction to characterize equilibrium bidding when bidders are heterogeneous both in cost and in the payments they expect after renegotiation. The model estimates show that bidders offer power below cost due to the expected value of later renegotiation. The model is used to simulate bidding and efficiency with strict contract enforcement. Contract enforcement is found to be pro‐competitive. With no renegotiation, equilibrium bids would rise to cover cost, but markups relative to total contract value fall sharply. Production costs decline, due to projects being allocated to lower‐cost bidders over those who expect larger payments in renegotiation.
We investigate the impact of a large and persistent economic shock on "deaths of despair." We find that areas more exposed to a plausibly exogenous change in international trade policy exhibit relative increases in fatal drug overdoses, specifically among whites. We show that these results are not driven by pre-existing trends in mortality rates, that the estimated relationships are robust to controls for state-level legislation pertaining to opioid availability and health care, and that the impact of the policy change on mortality coincides with a deterioration in labor market conditions and uptake of disability insurance.
Even with comparable innate ability and performance, women may be subject to discrimination. We run a field experiment across 143 Malawian villages in which either men or women were assigned the task of learning about a new agricultural technology, and then communicating it to others to convince them to adopt. Objective measures of these communicators’ knowledge and adoption of the new technology show no gender gap in their ability to acquire, retain and use the information. Yet, micro-data on individual interactions from 6500 farmers show that other farmers are less willing to learn from female communicators, whom they perceive not to be as good at farming as their male counterparts. In spite of this, other farmers learn just as much about the technology when the communicator role is reserved for women, and they experience similar farm yields.