Saxena & Shukla: Improving Markets to Unlock Growth and Development
In the lead-up to the 2023 “Firms, Trade, and Development” conference, two of its organizers look at recent research. The conference will be hosted by the Yale Economic Growth Center (EGC) and the International Growth Centre (IGC) with a live video link on October 19-20.
On the surface, a bumper crop might just be the breakthrough a struggling farmer needs to overcome poverty; however, in low- and middle-income (LMIC) countries, market frictions and distortions may still derail the path to economic relief. What do we know about these challenges, and how may policy interventions ease them?
Understanding market frictions through the lens of agriculture
In LMICs, farmers face many challenges, from sowing and nurturing crops to harvesting and distributing them. Even if crops withstand the vagaries of the climate and water supply, the efforts of farmers may still be thwarted by obstacles posed by the markets in which they sell their crops. They may have to pay a disproportionately high cost to a local trucker to bring their harvest to a nearby market for sale. There, they may be forced to negotiate with buyers (agricultural intermediaries) who hold most of the bargaining power. If the offer price is too low, they may still feel compelled to sell – a need compounded by a lack of access to credit and storage facilities. Even when government programs that guarantee minimum crop prices exist, imperfect implementation and/or a lack of awareness about these programs might prevent them from reaping the benefits.
On a broader scale, the link between well-functioning markets and economic growth is widely acknowledged by economists and policymakers. In a well-functioning market, firms can thrive, and consumers can readily access the desired goods and services. Conversely, when markets fail to function well due to frictions or distortions, they may disincentivize production and/or consumption, leading to economic stagnation or decline. Still, while market imperfections are present everywhere, they are more acute in LMICs than in higher-income countries.
To put this into perspective, consider a farmer in a high-income country for whom the aforementioned concerns may be minimal, if at all present. Once the harvest is ready, farmers in high-income countries have access to a range of logistical and financial services and well-established supply chains, which allow them to focus more on productive agricultural practices and less on navigating market inefficiencies.
Market frictions and market power in low- and middle-income countries
In LMICs, market frictions and distortions pervade intensely across sectors, directly impacting both firms and consumers in these markets. An extensive body of recent empirical research has documented these – quantifying their impact and identifying potential policy solutions. To name a few, recent work in developing countries has highlighted the gains from addressing across- and within-country trade frictions (Atkin and Donaldson, 2015; Chatterjee, 2023; Donaldson, 2018; Shu and Steinwender, 2019), barriers to entry and exit of firms (Leone et al., 2021; Majerovitz, 2023), missing insurance and credit markets (Casaburi and Willis, 2018; Karlan et al., 2014), and poor access to inputs (Bas and Paunov, 2021; Goldberg et al., 2010).
An especially important challenge, one that has been the focus of a growing body of research, is market power. Market power is the ability of a firm to directly influence market-level outcomes such as product quantity, quality, variety, and prices. It commonly manifests in the form of high output prices, which can negatively impact downstream firms and consumers. Market power can also emerge as monopsony power – the ability of a firm to set input prices, such as employee wages or, in agriculture, the prices paid to farmers. Of course, in some instances, it may be optimal to allow firms to wield market power – particularly when the cost of entering a market is prohibitively high. The prospect of exercising market power can incentivize investment and innovation, enabling firms to recuperate their initial costs and promote the growth and development of an industry. Nonetheless, excessive market power can harm consumers and stifle the growth of adjacent industries.
In LMICs, where the state capacity for antitrust regulation and enforcement is often limited, market power can be especially pervasive and unchecked. Recent work has shown the various ways in which market power affects firm and consumer outcomes in agricultural markets. Bergquist and Dinerstein (2020) provide experimental evidence that agricultural intermediaries in Kenya behave like a cartel, and only pass on about 22% of upstream cost savings to their consumers. Chatterjee (2023) shows how policies in India that limit spatial competition between agricultural intermediaries lower farmer incomes. Outside of agriculture, De Loecker et al. (2016) illustrate how market power dampened the benefits to consumers from trade liberalization in India. Easing of trade restrictions allowed Indian firms to import cheaper inputs, but this decline in input costs did not translate into a similar decline in consumer prices. In addition, Sharma (2023) shows how the wage-setting (monopsony) power of firms can explain part of the gender wage gap in Brazil.