Research

We show using a theoretical framework that embeds a voting model in a general-equilibrium model of a rural economy with two interest groups defined by land ownership that the effects of democratization – a shift from control of public resources by the landed elite to a democratic regime with universal suffrage – on the portfolio of public goods is heterogeneous, depending the population landless. In accord with the model and empirical findings from micro data on the differing material interests of the two land classes, we find, based on 30-year panel data describing the democratization of Indian villages, that democratization in villages with a larger landless population share shifted resources away from public irrigation, secondary schools, and electrification and towards programs that increase employment. When the landed farmers have a large population share, public resources were shifted towards irrigation, secondary schools and electrification and away from employment programs.

We build a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model to study the economic effects of the 2004 enlargement of the European Union. In our model, trade is costly and households of different skills and nationalities face costly forward-looking migration decisions. We exploit the timing of migration policy changes to identify the changes in migration costs. We find that the changes in migration and trade policy resulted in aggregate welfare gains but with heterogeneous effects across skill groups. We study the interaction between trade and migration policies and highlight the importance of trade for quantifying the welfare and migration effects of labor market integration.

Alfred Marshall and Mary Paley Marshall are often described as the first academic economist couple. Both studied at the University of Cambridge, where Paley became one of the first women to take the Tripos exam and the first female lecturer in economics, with Marshall’s encouragement. But in later life, Marshall opposed granting Cambridge degrees to women and their participation in academic economics. This paper recounts Alfred Marshall’s use of gender norms, born out of a separate spheres ideology, to promote and ingrain women’s exclusion in academic economics and beyond. We demonstrate the persistence of this ideology and resultant norms, drawing parallels between gendered inequities in labor market outcomes for Cambridge graduates in the UK post-Industrial Revolution and those apparent in cross-country data today. We argue that the persistence of the norms produced by separate spheres ideologies is likely to reflect, at least in part, the rents associated with preferential access to better paid, high-skilled labor market opportunities. In doing so, we ask who benefits from gender norms, who enforces them, and suggest relevant policy work and areas for future research.

Do patents facilitate or frustrate innovation? Lawyers, economists, and politicians who have staked out strong positions in this debate often attempt to validate their claims by invoking the historical record—but they typically get the history wrong. The purpose of this book is to get the history right by showing that patent systems are the product of contending interests at different points in production chains battling over economic surplus. The larger the potential surplus, the more extreme are the efforts of contending parties, now and in the past, to search out, generate, and exploit any and all sources of friction. Patent systems, as human creations, are therefore necessarily ridden with imperfections; nirvana is not on the menu. The most interesting intellectual issue is not how patent systems are imperfect, but why historically US-style patent systems have come to dominate all other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The answer offered by the essays in this volume is that they create a temporary property right that can be traded in a market, thereby facilitating a productive division of labor and making it possible for firms to transfer technological knowledge to one another by overcoming the free-rider problem. Precisely because the value of a patent does not inhere in the award itself but rather in the market value of the resulting property right, patent systems foster a decentralized ecology of inventors and firms that ceaselessly extends the frontiers of what is economically possible.

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.

For centuries, irrigation communities in south-eastern Spain were socially stable and economically efficient. In this article, we show how these self-governing institutions persisted by resolving conflicts over scarce resources with flexible punishment for water theft. We argue that variable penalties for violating irrigation rules provided social insurance to farmers during droughts. We develop a dynamic model in which judges trade off crime deterrence and social insurance, and test its predictions using a novel dataset on water theft in the self-governed irrigation community of Mula, Spain, from 1851 to 1948. For the same offence, we show that recidivists were punished more harshly than first-time offenders. When the defendant was wealthy, as indicated by the honorific title don, or the victim was poor, judgements were stricter.

This paper employs a benchmark heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic model to examine a number of plausible drivers of the rise in wealth inequality in the US over the last forty years. We find that the significant drop in tax progressivity starting in the late 1970s is the most important driver of the increase in wealth inequality since then. The sharp observed increases in earnings inequality and the falling labor share over the recent decades fall far short of accounting for the data. The model can also account for the dynamics of wealth inequality over the period—in particular the observed U-shape—and here the observed variations in asset returns are key. Returns on assets matter because portfolios of households differ systematically both across and within wealth groups, a feature in our model that also helps us to match, quantitatively, a key long-run feature of wealth and earnings distributions: the former is much more highly concentrated than the latter.

The most common business enterprise form in Germany today is the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). The GmbH offers entrepreneurs the partnership’s flexibility combined with limited liability, capital lock-in, and other traits associated with corporations. Earlier enterprise forms such as the partnership and corporation were codified versions of longstanding practice; the GmbH, on the other hand, was the lawgiver’s creation. Authorized in 1892, the GmbH appeared during a period of ferment in German enterprise law and was an early example of the “Private Limited-Liability Company” (PLLC) prevalent in many economies today. This paper traces the debates and the legislative process that led to the GmbH’s introduction. The new form reflected challenges created by the corporation reform of 1884, problems in German colonial companies, and the view that British company law had put German firms at a competitive disadvantage. Many new enterprises adopted the GmbH, but significant sections of the financial and legal community harbored strong reservations about this legal innovation.

The first modern German cooperatives began operations in the 1840s and faced, among other challenges, unfriendly legal rules. In Prussia, cooperatives experienced official harassment as allies of the then-oppositional Liberals. More importantly, cooperatives lacked the right to act as bodies, forcing them to engage in expensive legal workarounds for simple tasks such as contracting debts. The first German cooperatives law, Prussia’s 1867 Act, made clear the cooperatives had a right to exist and gave them the right to act as entities. Further development in the cooperative movement exposed flaws in the original act. The 1889 (Reich) Cooperatives Act legalized some organizational differences in the newer, rural cooperatives, and introduced compulsory external audits for cooperatives. Most famously, the 1889 Act first allowed cooperatives with limited liability, a step that made German cooperatives more similar to those elsewhere in Europe. The historical literature on cooperatives has neglected two important parts of this story: problems with the way unlimited liability operated under the 1867 Act, and the close connection between cooperative and company law.

This article sets recent expressions of alarm about the monopoly power of technology giants such as Google and Amazon in the long history of Americans' response to big business. I argue that we cannot understand that history unless we realize that Americans have always been concerned about the political and economic dangers of bigness, not just the threat of high prices. The problem policymakers faced after the rise of Standard Oil was how to protect society against those dangers without punishing firms that grew large because they were innovative. The antitrust regime put in place in the early twentieth century managed this balancing act by focusing on large firms' conduct toward competitors and banning practices that were anticompetitive or exclusionary. Maintaining this balance was difficult, however, and it gave way over time—first to a preoccupation with market power during the post–World War II period, and then to a fixation on consumer welfare in the late twentieth century. Refocusing policy on large firms' conduct would do much to address current fears about bigness without penalizing firms whose market power comes from innovation.