The economic impact of crop residue burning
A recent study estimates that crop residue burning caused 86,000 premature deaths in India in 2018, with over half of the deaths due to paddy (i.e. rice) residue burning in the state of Punjab (Lan et al. 2022). Roughly 4 million acres of paddy residue were burned in Punjab in 2018. Using $700,000 as the value of a statistical life (Majumder et al. 2018), the average mortality costs per acre of burning are $8,000. In comparison, paddy production generates about $500 per acre in revenue. This suggests that eliminating residue burning would almost certainly increase societal welfare.
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in Punjab, India
In Jack et al. (2022), we test the importance of contract design in improving compliance with PES programmes. To alleviate constraints such as liquidity (which implies farmers will not have cash prior to be being paid to rent equipment to manage crop residue), or trust (they do not trust that the conditional portion of the payment will materialise), we vary both the total (conditional) amount offered, as well as the proportion of payment that is paid upfront (unconditionally). If upfront payments are effective in alleviating liquidity and/or trust constraints, they may be more effective than standard contracts. However, since the marginal (conditional) payment for compliance is lower in these contracts, they may reduce compliance.
We conducted a randomised controlled trial in 171 villages in the Indian state of Punjab during the 2019 rice-growing (kharif) season to compare the efficacy of standard PES and partial upfront PES. We compare three farmer groups: those who did not receive a contract (control), those who received a contract with payment conditional on verification that the farmer did not burn (standard PES), and those who received a contract with a partial upfront payment that was (explicitly) unconditional on compliance, with the remainder conditionally paid after verification (upfront PES). The standard PES arm comprised two treatment arms. The first offered farmers 800 rupees per acre to comply, and the second, 1600 rupees per acre. The upfront payment arm also comprised two treatment arms: the first offered farmers 800 rupees per acre to comply, of which 200 was paid upfront; and the second, 800 rupees per acre, 400 upfront.
Measuring impact of PES on crop burning
We measured how PES impacted crop burning using multiple data sources. First, we used contract compliance data to understand if farmers that were monitored participated in burning or not. Second, we used remote sensing measures that construct a predicted measure of not burning for all farmers. Third, we used data from our endline survey on measures of crop residue management including primary alternatives to crop burning, which are agricultural implements that either remove residue from the field (ex-situ) such as balers, or directly seed the next crop into the residue (in-situ), such as Happy Seeders (no-till planters towed behind tractors).
Take-up of PES contract offers: Take-up of PES contracts was high, with around 72% of farmers in both treatment arms signing the contract. Farmers given initial advance did not show higher take-up, possibly due to the fact that the initial advance was not offered at the time of the contract offer (it was disbursed in two to three days once their bank account information has been processed).
Reduction in crop burning and use of alternatives: Offering part of the PES transfer in advance led to significant reduction in crop burning (using satellite imagery to measure burning). Relative to the control group, upfront PES reduced burning by 8 to 11.5 percentage points. In contrast, the effects of standard PES relative to the control group is indistinguishable from zero. This shows that altering the design of standard conditional cash transfers has important implications for the efficacy of the contract.
The reduction in burning is largely matched by an increase in the use of ex-situ management equipment (namely, balers) in the upfront contract arm, increasing by about 9.5 percentage points relative to the control group. There is no increase in the use of ex-situ equipment, which is more expensive on average, reflecting farmers’ preferences for the use of ex-situ management techniques in this setting.
Programme costs and benefits
To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of PES programmes, we compare PES costs with the benefits of reduced residue burning. Despite non-compliance from a substantial portion of farmers paid upfront, the estimated cost of the programme is drastically lower than our rough per-acre mortality benefit estimate ($8,000).
These results show that crop residue burning can be reduced through well-designed PES payments. Our design, which takes institutional constraints and farmer concerns into account, can significantly improve efficacy. Providing a portion of the contract payment upfront results in larger reductions in burning than providing the entire payment after participants have completed costly behaviour change. Despite higher “wasted” payments (to farmers who continue to burn), PES with upfront payments is still cost-effective. It results in burning reductions that provide benefits far in excess of their cost.
PES programmes provide reasons for optimism. They are appealing because they can be implemented by organisations that want to reduce fires but lack the authority to levy fines. Furthermore, the need for upfront payments might become less important as trust in being paid grows over time. The enormity of the environmental risks justifies an investment in PES and other programmes to reduce crop residue burning in India – and in understanding how to make them work for farmers.
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