This paper examines creation and distribution of surplus from global value chains (GVCs) in low- and middle-income country (LMIC) domestic supply chains. While GVC participation can enhance growth and productivity, low prices paid to small in-put suppliers raise concerns that gains from GVC participation accrue to the large exporters (the buyers). Supply-chain transactions often occur in bargained agreements with non-price terms that increase small supplier surplus, such as quantity stability and other insurance-like terms. Therefore, low input prices reflect both buyers’ share of surplus generated by non-price terms and buyer capture. I enrich a Nash bargaining model to study how both i) value creation through insurance-like agreement terms that mitigate spot market frictions and ii) value capture from buyers threatening to replace external suppliers with in-house production affect prices paid to small, risk-averse suppliers. Using novel transaction data from an Indian garment manufacturer and its nearly 500 fabric suppliers, I estimate a structural model to decompose dis-counts into value creation and capture. Results illustrate that discounts reflect value creation rather than buyer capture; difference-in-differences estimates yield consistent findings. Counterfactual analyses highlight that increasing buyer competition has lim-ited effects on prices paid to small risk-averse suppliers, whereas introducing profit insurance substantially increases prices they receive.
Welfare depends on the quantity, quality, and range of goods consumed. We use trade data, which report the quantities and prices of the individual goods that countries exchange, to learn about how the gains from trade and growth break down into these different margins. Our general equilibrium model, in which both quality and quantity contribute to consumption and to production, captures (i) how prices increase with importer and exporter per capita income, (ii) how the range of goods traded rises with importer and exporter size, and (iii) how products traveling longer distances have higher prices. Our framework can deliver a standard gravity formulation for total trade flows and for the gains from trade. We find that growth in the extensive margin contributes to about half of overall gains. Quality plays a larger role in the welfare gains from international trade than from economic growth due to selection.
A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue- optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off platform. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers.
This paper presents a model of consumption behavior that explains the presence of “wealthy hand-to-mouth” consumers using a mechanism that differs from those analyzed previously. We show that a two-asset model with temptation preferences generates a demand for commitment and thus illiquidity, leading to hand-to-mouth behavior even when liquid assets deliver higher returns than illiquid assets. This preference for illiquidity has important implications for consumption behavior and for fiscal stimulus policies. Our model matches the recent empirical evidence that Marginal Propensity to Consume remain high even for large income shocks, suggesting a larger response to targeted fiscal stimulus than previously believed.
We derive a small open economy (SOE) as the limit of an economy as the number or size of its trading partners goes to infinity and trade costs also go to infinity. We obtain this limit in the Armington, Eaton–Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models. In all cases, the trade of the SOE with the foreign countries approaches a finite limit, and the domestic expenditure share for the SOE approaches a limit that is not zero or unity. The foreign countries can be either infinitely many SOEs, or alternatively, one or many large countries with domestic expenditure shares that approach unity. We illustrate the usefulness of this framework by obtaining a formula for the optimal tariff in the SOE – depending on the elasticity of domestic wages with respect to the tariff – that is consistent with all models.
We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges’ (non)participation in Chile’s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.
We quantify the effects of the political development cycle – the fluctuations between the left (Maoist) and the right (pragmatist) development policies – on growth and structural transformation of China in 1953-1978. The left policies prioritized structural transformation towards non-agricultural production and consumption at the cost of agricultural development. The right policies prioritized agricultural consumption through slower structural transformation. The imperfect implementation of these policies led to large welfare costs of the political development cycle in a distorted economy undergoing a structural change.
We document that sales of individual products decline steadily throughout most of the product life cycle. Products quickly become obsolete as they face competition from newer products sold by competing firms and the same firm. We build a dynamic model that highlights an innovation-obsolescence cycle, where firms need to introduce new products to grow; otherwise, their portfolios become obsolete as rivals introduce their own new products. By introducing new products, however, firms accelerate the decline of their own existing products, further depressing their sales. This mechanism has sizable implications for quantifying economic growth and the impact of innovation policies.
We document strong skill matching in Turkish firms’ production networks. Additionally, in the data, export demand shocks from rich countries increase firms’ skill intensity and their trade with skill-intensive domestic partners. We explain these patterns using a quantitative model with heterogeneous firms, quality choices, and endogenous networks. A counterfactual economy-wide export demand shock of 5% leads both exporters and nonexporters to upgrade quality, raising the average wage by 1.2%. This effect is nine times the effect in a scenario without interconnected quality choices. We use the model to study the conditions for the success of export promotion policies.
This paper concerns technology escaping from the United States and how much we should be concerned about it. This topic appears frequently in news articles, with the presumption that we should be very concerned. Since technology is non rival, maybe we shouldn’t be too concerned. Even after it’s escaped, we still have it. But, given security concerns, maybe we should be concerned about some of these technologies escaping. I applaud the authors for bringing rigorous analysis to this contentious issue.