Research

Market-based environmental regulations are seldom used in low-income countries, where pollution is highest but state capacity is often low. We collaborated with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) to design and experimentally evaluate the world’s first particulate-matter emissions market, which covered industrial plants in a large Indian city. There are three main findings. First, the market functioned well. Treatment plants, randomly assigned to the emissions market, traded permits to become significant net sellers or buyers. After trading, treatment plants held enough permits to cover their emissions 99% of the time, compared with just 66% compliance with standards under the command-and-control status quo. Second, treatment plants reduced pollution emissions, relative to control plants, by 20%–30%. Third, the market reduced abatement costs by an estimated 11%, holding constant emissions. This cost-savings estimate is based on plant-specific marginal cost curves that we estimate from the universe of bids to buy and sell permits in the market. The combination of pollution reductions and low costs imply that the emissions market has mortality benefits that exceed its costs by at least 25 times.

This paper examines creation and distribution of surplus from global value chains (GVCs) in low- and middle-income country (LMIC) domestic supply chains. While GVC participation can enhance growth and productivity, low prices paid to small in-put suppliers raise concerns that gains from GVC participation accrue to the large exporters (the buyers). Supply-chain transactions often occur in bargained agreements with non-price terms that increase small supplier surplus, such as quantity stability and other insurance-like terms. Therefore, low input prices reflect both buyers’ share of surplus generated by non-price terms and buyer capture. I enrich a Nash bargaining model to study how both i) value creation through insurance-like agreement terms that mitigate spot market frictions and ii) value capture from buyers threatening to replace external suppliers with in-house production affect prices paid to small, risk-averse suppliers. Using novel transaction data from an Indian garment manufacturer and its nearly 500 fabric suppliers, I estimate a structural model to decompose dis-counts into value creation and capture. Results illustrate that discounts reflect value creation rather than buyer capture; difference-in-differences estimates yield consistent findings. Counterfactual analyses highlight that increasing buyer competition has lim-ited effects on prices paid to small risk-averse suppliers, whereas introducing profit insurance substantially increases prices they receive.

Welfare depends on the quantity, quality, and range of goods consumed. We use trade data, which report the quantities and prices of the individual goods that countries exchange, to learn about how the gains from trade and growth break down into these different margins. Our general equilibrium model, in which both quality and quantity contribute to consumption and to production, captures (i) how prices increase with importer and exporter per capita income, (ii) how the range of goods traded rises with importer and exporter size, and (iii) how products traveling longer distances have higher prices. Our framework can deliver a standard gravity formulation for total trade flows and for the gains from trade. We find that growth in the extensive margin contributes to about half of overall gains. Quality plays a larger role in the welfare gains from international trade than from economic growth due to selection.

We study communication frictions within multinationals (MNCs), hypothesizing that language barriers reduce management knowledge transfers within the organization. A distinct feature of such MNCs is a three-tier hierarchy: foreign managers (FMs) supervise domestic managers (DMs) who supervise production workers. Tailored surveys from our setting – MNCs in Myanmar – reveal that language barriers impede interactions between FMs and DMs. A first experimental protocol offers DMs free English courses and confirms that lowering communications costs increases their interactions with FMs. A second experimental protocol that asks human-resource managers at domestic firms to rate hypothetical resumes reveals that multinational experience and, specifically, DM-FM interactions are valued in the domestic labor market. Together, these results suggest that reducing language barriers can improve transfers of management knowledge, an interpretation supported by improvements in soft skills among treatment DMs in the first experiment. A model in which communication within MNCs is non-contractible – a realistic feature of workplace life – reveals that the experimental results are consistent with underinvestment in language training and provide a rationale for policy intervention.

A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue- optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off platform. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers.

This paper presents a model of consumption behavior that explains the presence of “wealthy hand-to-mouth” consumers using a mechanism that differs from those analyzed previously. We show that a two-asset model with temptation preferences generates a demand for commitment and thus illiquidity, leading to hand-to-mouth behavior even when liquid assets deliver higher returns than illiquid assets. This preference for illiquidity has important implications for consumption behavior and for fiscal stimulus policies. Our model matches the recent empirical evidence that Marginal Propensity to Consume remain high even for large income shocks, suggesting a larger response to targeted fiscal stimulus than previously believed.

We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges’ (non)participation in Chile’s centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.

We derive a small open economy (SOE) as the limit of an economy as the number or size of its trading partners goes to infinity and trade costs also go to infinity. We obtain this limit in the Armington, Eaton–Kortum, Krugman, and Melitz models. In all cases, the trade of the SOE with the foreign countries approaches a finite limit, and the domestic expenditure share for the SOE approaches a limit that is not zero or unity. The foreign countries can be either infinitely many SOEs, or alternatively, one or many large countries with domestic expenditure shares that approach unity. We illustrate the usefulness of this framework by obtaining a formula for the optimal tariff in the SOE – depending on the elasticity of domestic wages with respect to the tariff – that is consistent with all models.

The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many "bystander" countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding the United States and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-Chinese tariffs identify whether a country's exports complement or substitute the United States or China and its supply curve's slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) the United States and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war.

We quantify the effects of the political development cycle – the fluctuations between the left (Maoist) and the right (pragmatist) development policies – on growth and structural transformation of China in 1953-1978. The left policies prioritized structural transformation towards non-agricultural production and consumption at the cost of agricultural development. The right policies prioritized agricultural consumption through slower structural transformation. The imperfect implementation of these policies led to large welfare costs of the political development cycle in a distorted economy undergoing a structural change.