# Learning about Women's Competence: the Dynamic Response of Political Parties to Gender Quotas in South Korea* 

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#### Abstract

Although gender quotas in politics are one of the most common affirmative action policies worldwide, the merits of these policies remain an object of debate. Opponents of quotas are concerned with an equity-efficiency tradeoff - quotas lower the average quality of politicians. This paper explores this tradeoff by studying the effect of gender quotas on parties' selection of candidates in South Korean municipal council elections. South Korea provides us with a rare opportunity to observe how highly male-dominated political parties react to gender quotas: (i) we can exploit the discontinuity in the intensity of the quota's effect at given cut-offs of council size; (ii) gender quotas were implemented in only one of two independent election arms, leaving space for adjustment in the other arm. We find that political parties initially counteract the quota by putting forth fewer female candidates in the unaffected arm. However, this pattern gradually reverses over time. The evidence is consistent with efficiency gains from the quota. Parties initially selected a suboptimally low number of women due to biased beliefs regarding their ability, but they slowly revise their beliefs after exposure.


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## 1 Introduction

Gender quotas in politics are currently used by 130 countries of the world (International IDEA, 2021). The rationale behind the quotas are that there are too few women in politics otherwise. The concept of "too few" can mean two very different things: i) the optimal number of women has been attained, just not equal representation, or ii) the optimal number of women is actually higher. The case of the former constitutes a standard equity-efficiency tradeoff - quotas reduce the quality of politicians by providing an advantage to less qualified or experienced individuals. Yet, Holzer and Neumark (2000) review that the empirical case against affirmative action on the grounds of efficiency is weak at best. More recent empirical studies draw similar conclusions. Bagues and Campa (2021) and Murray (2010) find that newly elected women are not less competent than men, while Besley et al. (2017), Baltrunaite et al. (2014), and Weeks and Baldez (2015) find that the introduction of quotas improves the overall quality of political representatives.

If quotas are needed because there are efficiency gains to be had with more women, then why hasn't the optimal number of women been attained in the first place? In this paper, we shed light to this question by studying how highly male-dominated political parties change their selection of political candidates in response to the introduction of quotas, over four election cycles.

The South Korean setting provides a rare opportunity to study the reaction of political parties since the gender quota regulates only one of the two separate arms through which councilors get elected. In South Korea's mixed electoral system, the first group of councilors is elected through a plurality vote in the municipality's constituent wards ("ward warm"). The second group is elected by party-list proportional representation ("PR arm"). The gender quota stipulates that all odd-number candidates in the party list for the PR arm be female. As the gender quota affects only the PR arm, we can study how parties strategically respond in the unconstrained ward arm. 1 Therefore, the existence of the ward arm enables us to detect what is typically unobservable: the preference of political parties for female candidates, or lack thereof.

Furthermore, as we can track parties over four election cycles post-quota, we distinguish between immediate and follow-up responses. It is the evolution of parties' responses over time that helps us uncover the reasons behind the initial under-representation of women.

For our identification strategy, we use the cross-sectional variation in the number of seats

[^1]reserved for proportional representation as a measure of the intensity of exposure to the gender quota. The number of PR seats increases as a step function of a municipality's council size, creating discontinuities in the intensity of the quota's bite at certain cutoffs of council size. Using a regression discontinuity framework, we study the effect of the quota on how political parties select candidates in the ward election arm.

We find that parties initially counteract the introduction of the quota. In the treated municipalities affected more intensely by the quota, parties initially put forth fewer female candidates in the unconstrained ward arm. The reduction in the number of female candidates is especially pronounced when the probability of winning is higher - in favorable ballot positions, in wards where a party has a stronghold, and among the two largest parties.

However, the pattern gradually reverses over time. Over the next three election cycles, parties in the treated municipalities gradually increase the number of female ward candidates. By the last election, these municipalities had entirely reversed their initial reaction and, in fact, had a greater number of female ward candidates than control municipalities.

What is driving this initial counteraction and gradual change in the response to quotas? The evidence is consistent with a mechanism of learning. Parties initially selected a suboptimally low number of women due to biased beliefs regarding their ability as political leaders, but gradually learn about their competence through exposure to female councilors. We formalize through a model the conditions under which the speed of learning is faster, and connect these to three pieces of evidence supporting the learning mechanism.

First, we find that the shift towards female candidates occurs faster and stronger when the elected women are more competent. Using education as a proxy for competence Baltrunaite et al., 2014; Bagues and Campa, 2021), we compare the parties in municipalities where the first female PR councilors post-quota were of above- and below-median level of education. Such treatment effect heterogeneity supports the mechanism of gradual learning about the competence of women, as opposed to a mechanism of growing taste for women where female ability plays no part.

Second, the shift in the choice of candidates occurs more strongly for parties with greater exposure to female councilors - the response is stronger for the parties the elected females belong to. To conduct this party-level analysis, we compare the strategies of parties that marginally won a female councilor in the previous election against those of parties that marginally lost. We find that parties that marginally won a woman put forth a higher female share among ward candidates in the following election cycle. Therefore, a party's future selection of candidates is more favorable towards women when the party gets a woman from within the party elected. This suggests that the learning effect is stronger when closer interactions with women take place.

Third, we find that the effect is stronger where the initial bias is stronger. Given that the gender of the even-number positions in the party list are unrestricted, we take parties that put males in the second position as those that had worse priors on the competence of females. Only for these parties do we see an increase in the share of female ward candidates after marginally winning a woman in the previous election cycle.

Furthermore, we rule out two alternative interpretations. Firstly, the initial counteraction and subsequent increase in the number of women is not related to the supply of qualified female candidates. If there was a shortage of qualified women, parties in treated municipalities would have had to pull women out from the ward arm to fill the party list initially. Moreover, the quota would have induced a faster growth in the number of women with political experience in treated municipalities, which might explain the gradual increase the number of female ward candidates. However, we show that treated municipalities did not have trouble finding women any more than control, and also that the same reverse in pattern over time exists for female candidates with zero councilor experience. Secondly, the evidence is not consistent with parties responding to a faster change in voters' preferences for females in treated municipalities. Similarly to Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012), we compare the gap in votes received by male and female ward candidates in treated and control municipalities. We find no evidence that the gender gap in votes decrease faster in treated municipalities.

From a policy perspective, much can be learned from the South Korean experience. This paper shows that quotas might deliver undesirable results when biased beliefs against female politicians are prevalent. With females holding only $3 \%$ of seats before the quota and more than $60 \%$ of the population agreeing with the statement that men make better political leaders than women (see Figure A2), South Korea would have been such a context. Indeed, we observe parties and their leaders initially counteracting the quota.

Quotas can still be effective in the long run, however, when designed appropriately. The quota imposed that a minimum number of qualified female councilors get elected, thereby opening up the possibility for learning to take place. This is different from other types of quotas that do not ensure women end up elected, such as quotas on the minimum share of women in candidate lists. Such quotas have been found to be limited in increasing female representation to appreciable levels (Bagues and Campa, 2021; Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2013).

South Korean politics is not the only context characterized by strong male-dominance and conservative gender attitudes. The South Korean experience can be informative for many other countries currently characterized by very low female representation in politics, including Brazil, Japan, Hungary, Iran, Malaysia, Moldavia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria. 2 More-

[^2]over, affirmative action policies are currently discussed also in other settings such as company boards (e.g. Global Gender Gap Report, 2021), where the incumbents are similarly, if not more, male-dominated and attitudes are equally male-friendly (see Figure A3 in Appendix Section A).

Our paper contributes to a large and growing literature on the consequences of political gender quotas, studied in numerous contexts and with mixed results (see Hessami and da Fonseca, 2020 for a review) $3^{3}$ However, while several studies look at final outcomes, only a few focus on the mechanisms that lead to these results, and even fewer study the reactions of the male-dominated pre-existing parties and their leaders (e.g. Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015, Besley et al. (2017)). ${ }^{4}$ We contribute to this literature as we are able to pin down the strategic responses of parties to the introduction of quotas and study them in an unusually rich way. The voting system with the quota only applying to the proportional representation arm implies a whole other arm is unconstrained. Furthermore, the unconstrained arm of the election system is the way through which around $85 \%$ of councilors are elected, and therefore constitutes the more consequential arm. Such a structure of gender quota greatly expands the degree of freedom in which parties can respond, relative to quotas that reserve seats for women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004, Clayton, 2015), alternate between male and female candidate lists (Besley et al., 2017), or mandate a minimum share of women in candidate lists (De Paola et al., 2010, Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012, Baltrunaite et al., 2014). The unique nature of South Korea's election system is what allows us to disentangle the immediate and follow-up responses, uncovering the story of learning about female competence.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the institutional setting of South Korea's municipal council elections. We then describe

[^3]the data in Section 3. Section 4 lays out our empirical strategy, and Section 5 discusses the results. In Sections 6 and 7, we present a model and we discuss the pieces of evidence that point towards learning as an explanation for the results. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Institutional setting

### 2.1 The role of municipal councils

There are 226 municipal councils in South Korea. Municipal councils represent the legislative branch that works with municipal governments, the executive branch, to oversee local matters. Councils have several legally defined responsibilities, which include reviewing and approving the spending of municipal governments, adopting and revising local bills, monitoring the municipal governments' administrative functions, and examining petitions submitted by residents. Municipal governments administer around a third of South Korea's total public expenditure (Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2018).

### 2.2 Electoral rules and gender quotas

Municipal councils were established during the mid-1990s, and from then, elections have taken place every four years. Seven elections were held so far, with 2018 being the latest election year. Up to the third election in 2002, all councilors were directly elected through plurality vote in single-member constituent wards. It was extremely rare to find candidates affiliated with a political party.

However, major reforms were made to the electoral rules from the fourth election in 2006. They are summarized in Table 1. First, the parallel voting system was introduced, where at least $10 \%$ of the councilors needed to be elected through party-list proportional representation. Among a total of 7 to 35 seats in a council, the number of proportional seats increased as a step function of the total council size: 1 for councils with up to 10 seats, 2 for those with 11 to 20 seats, 3 for those with 21 to 30 seats, and so on.

Table 1: Amendments to legislation on municipal council elections

| First applicable <br> election year | Amendment |
| :---: | :--- |
| 2006 | $[\mathrm{PR}]$ Proportional representation introduced |
|  | $[\mathrm{W}]$ Single-member plurality vote $\rightarrow$ Multi-member plurality vote |
|  | $[\mathrm{PR}]$ Odd-number candidates in party lists must be female (not enforced) |
|  | $[\mathrm{W}]$ Subsidies to parties for nominating female candidates |
| 2010 | $[\mathrm{PR}]$ Odd-number candidates in party lists must be female (enforced) |
|  | $[\mathrm{W}]$ At least one female candidate per general election district |

Notes: Adapted from Lim 2018). [PR] indicates rules relating to proportional representation councilors and [W] to ward councilors.

Second, the remaining seats were reserved for plurality voting in multi-member constituent wards. Each constituency elected between 2 and 4 councilors, and therefore multiple candidates from the same party could run in the same constituency ${ }^{5}$ Figure 1 illustrates what the ballot papers look like for the two arms of the municipal council elections.

Figure 1: Ballot papers in municipal council elections


Notes: This figure illustrates the ballot papers that a voter residing in ward X of municipality A receives for the municipal council elections. The one on the left is used to vote for ward councilors and the one on the right is used to vote for PR councilors. The red ticks indicate how the voter might vote.

Third, a gender quota was put in place: all odd-number candidates in the proportional party list needed to be female. As the numbers of seats reserved for proportional representation are small, most elected councilors turned out to be the first candidates in the lists, and therefore female. As a consequence, the introduction of quotas sharply increased the

[^4]proportion of female councilors. Municipal councils were severely male-dominated prior to the reform, with only $3 \%$ of councilors being female. Due to the introduction of quotas in 2005, female representation in municipal councils reached more than $30 \%$ in the last election in 2018. Figure 2 illustrates how the female ratio developed in municipal councils over time. The most striking feature is the sharp rise in the female ratio immediately after the reform.

Figure 2: Proportion of females in municipal councils, nationwide average


Notes: This figure illustrates the nationwide average of the gender ratio in municipal councils, for every election cycle since their emergence. The red dotted line indicates the year of the major reform that instituted the gender quota.

Last, subsidies were offered to parties based on the female ratio among the parties' candidates nationwide. However, it is unlikely that the subsidies affected much of the political parties strategies, particularly at the municipality level. The scale of the subsidies have been criticized for being too low to effectively expand female nomination (Jin, 2018; Kim et al., 2003; Lee, 2003). Indeed, they account for only around 5 to $6 \%$ of the total value of election subsidies (National Election Commission, 2018). Therefore, the presence of the subsidies are unlikely to have impacted political parties' selection of candidates.

Amendments to electoral rules continued between the 2006 and 2010 elections. It was stipulated that in either the municipal council elections or the higher-up provincial council elections, there must be at least one female candidate in each general election district. As there are around 250 general election districts, compared to 226 municipalities, a general election district approximately compares to a municipality ${ }^{6}$ Legislative Impact Analysis

[^5]Reports indicate that most parties chose to satisfy this rule in the municipal council elections, due to the larger number of candidates (Lee, 2019). Selecting which ward to place the female candidate would have been a strategic concern for the political parties.

### 2.3 Background behind the adoption of gender quotas

If some parties had led the move for the reform against opposition from other parties, then we should recognize that parties' strategic responses to the quota might be very heterogeneous in nature. Thus, here we discuss the background behind the adoption of the quota.

Before gender quotas were adopted in the municipal council elections, they were adopted first in the general election for the National Assembly in 2004. The adoption was influenced by increasing demands by women's organizations to raise female representation in politics, which at the time was dramatically behind the international average..$^{7}$ As females constitute half the voters, it was in the interest of political parties to put gender quotas forward amongst their election pledges. Moreover, there are views that the adoption of the quota was also a political tactic (Jeon, 2013). Political parties wanted to increase the size of the National Assembly back to what it was before the size cut during the Asian Financial Crisis, and the fact that the majority of the added seats will go to females, with the quota, made for a good excuse to expand the Assembly.

Once the quota was adopted in the general election, it became the natural next step to introduce it in the regional elections. The gender quota in the municipal council election was passed in the National Assembly, led by both major parties. Some argue that there was political motivation behind it, too (Kim, 2005). One new element in the reform was the party nomination system - a ward candidate must be nominated by their party in order to run with the party affiliation - but it was disputed as a ploy to deepen party influence. Political parties used the quota to justify the party nomination system, since the gender quota was embedded in the proportional representation arm where party nomination was essential.

To sum, it is difficult to say that there was a major division among political parties in their support of the gender quota when it was passed.
municipality may contain five general election districts, and up to five small municipalities may comprise a general election district.
${ }^{7}$ See Cho and Kim 2010 for a summary of the major activities of women's organizations.

## 3 Data

Two sources of data are used. First, data related to the execution of the elections are collected by web scraping the website of the National Election Commission. The website posts detailed data on all past elections, including population, candidate information, and vote outcomes. Second, to examine the consequence of the municipal councils' legislative activities, we use the data on municipal governments' expenditures from the Local Finance Disclosure System of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.

### 3.1 Population

Because ward divisions are centrally determined based on population size, population data is published. The number of residents is available by ward, voting eligibility, gender, and citizenship status. Moreover, the data includes the number of households by ward. This data is used to perform balancing checks in order to validate the identification strategy, which relies on the assumption that municipalities locally around the PR seat thresholds are similar.

### 3.2 Candidates

Various background characteristics of all candidates are also made publicly available by the National Election Commission. These are election arm (ward or PR) classification, election district name, candidate number, party affiliation, name, gender, date of birth, age, occupation, education, and pertinent work experience. Whether a candidate is favored by his or her party is revealed by the election arm and candidate number. Typically, candidates that are deemed less competitive are placed on the PR election arm, and the candidate numbers directly translate to the position on the ballot, in which higher positions attract more votes.

Figure 3 illustrates how the female share among candidates have been increasing continually, even when not stipulated by the quota. In particular, plot [b] shows that more females are running in wards as the sole candidates of their parties, and plot [c] shows that more females are taking the highest ballot positions even when multiple same-party candidates are running. Plot [d], on the other hand, shows that more females are taking the even-number party list slots, which would not happen with a strong preference for men. $\sqrt[8]{ }$

[^6]
## Figure 3: The share of females among non-quota candidates



Notes: This figure plots the share of females among [a] all ward candidates, [b] ward candidates with no within-party competition, [c] ward candidates that have within-party competition but is ranked the highest, and [d] PR candidates in even-number party list positions. The left-hand vertical axis corresponds to [a], $[\mathrm{b}]$, and $[\mathrm{c}]$, whereas the right-hand one corresponds to $[\mathrm{d}]$.

### 3.3 Votes

The website of the National Election Commission also includes vote counts by ward. These vote counts enable us to see in which wards parties have their strongholds. Therefore, we can categorize wards into safe and contestable ones in the perspective of the political parties. Parties would then allocate their favored and less favored candidates to different wards accordingly.

Moreover, we can learn by which margin the winners won. In the regression discontinuity identification strategy, we rely on the assumption that close victories result in sharp changes in the composition of councilors by party, in an environment where parties enjoy similar degrees of popularity from the voters.

Electoral outcomes determine the gender ratio of the elected councilors. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the gender composition of councils by election cycle. The table also
depicts how the reform in 2005 introduced the PR arm as well as the gender quota in that arm.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the gender composition of municipal councils

| Election cycle (year) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |  |
|  | $(1995)$ | $(1998)$ | $(2002)$ | $(2006)$ | $(2010)$ | $(2014)$ | $(2018)$ |  |
| Total number of councilors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Min. | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |  |
| Mean | 19.9 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.8 | 12.8 |  |
| Max. | 50 | 40 | 41 | 36 | 34 | 43 | 44 |  |
| Number of PR councilors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Min. | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Mean | - | - | - | 1.63 | 1.63 | 1.67 | 1.70 |  |
| Max. | - | - | - | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |  |
| Gender ratio |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Min. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.10 |  |
| Mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.29 |  |
| Max. | 0.43 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.46 | 0.57 | 0.86 | 0.64 |  |
| Gender ratio among PR councilors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Min. | - | - | - | $0 *$ | $0 *$ | 0.50 | 0.50 |  |
| Mean | - | - | - | 0.87 | 0.96 | 0.97 | 0.98 |  |
| Max. | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Minimum number of women required |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Min. | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Mean | - | - | - | 1.12 | 1.12 | 1.13 | 1.13 |  |
| Max. | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |  |

Notes: *gender quotas were introduced in 2005. However, during the election of 2006, they remained merely a strong recommendation, so it was still legal to place a male in slot 1 of party lists. Most municipalities complied, but 14 of them had no female PR councilors. In election year 2010, the minimum of the gender ratio among PR councilors is 0 because in one council the elected woman was invalidated for being a member of multiple parties.

### 3.4 Municipal budget

Municipal budget data is used to perform balancing checks, to show that municipalities locally around the PR seat thresholds are similar in terms of economic scale and council performance. The budget of a municipal government reflects the economic prosperity of the municipality, as around a half is sourced from local tax and non-tax revenue. In addition, data is available on the share of the municipality's expenditures spent on running the municipal council (2002-2020). There have been numerous accusations in the past of councilors appropriating large sums of the local budget for their private use (Local Decentralization Bureau - Election and Local Council Division, 2019). For instance, they would go on international policy-research trips where the itinerary largely consists of sightseeing. Another example is of councilors ordering member pins made of pure gold. As such, a measure of the
performance of a council is the frugality of its operation costs. Newspapers have traditionally included it in their assessments of councils (Jang, 2008).

## 4 Empirical Strategy

### 4.1 Regression discontinuity design around the number of PR seats

To get at the causal effect of the gender quota, we make use of the fact that the gender quota affects municipalities at different intensities depending on the proportion of the PR seats in the council. The number of PR seats increases as a step function of municipal council size, which is pre-determined centrally by the National Election Commission based on population size and regional representativeness. The step function is depicted by the navy dots in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Councils by bins around each threshold


Notes: This figure depicts how the number of seats reserved for the proportional representation arm increases as a step function of the total number of councilors in a municipality. There are municipalities that do not correspond to the step function, because they are formed by the union of multiple municipalities after the election took place. The municipalities pre- and post-union are all excluded from the sample as outliers and are not shown in this figure. Moreover, the figure depicts how a council is categorized into a bin based on its most proximate threshold.

The regression discontinuity design compares the characteristics of ward and PR candidates in municipalities on each side of the step function's thresholds, while controlling for council size. In order to account for the fact that there is not just one but many thresholds, we categorize councils into bins based on the proximity to thresholds, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Therefore, this strategy estimates the effect of an additional PR councilor in general, rather than an additional female PR councilor. Nonetheless, while the gender quota does not necessitate that the second PR councilor be male, in practice almost all PR councilors end up being female. $\sqrt[9]{ }$ This fact is due to PR candidates even in even-number positions frequently being female, and also due to PR councilors frequently being the number- 1 candidates of multiple parties ${ }^{10}$ We also check in Section 4.3 that an additional PR councilor strongly implies an increase in the number of female PR councilors.

The regression discontinuity specification is given by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{c b t}=\alpha_{b}+\alpha_{t}+\sum_{s=4}^{7} \beta_{s} \times \text { Treat }_{c b t}+f\left(x_{c b t}\right)+\epsilon_{c b t} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y_{c b t}$ denotes the outcome variable for municipal council $c$ belonging to bin $b$ in election cycle $t$. The running variable is $x_{c b t} \equiv(\text { council size })_{c b t}-$ threshold $_{b}$, with threshold ${ }_{b} \in$ $\{10,20,30\}$. In addition, Treat Tbt $\equiv \mathbb{1}\left(x_{c b t} \geq 0\right)$, signifying an additional PR councilor. Therefore, $\beta_{s}$ estimates the effect of having an additional PR councilor, pooling all the bins together, in election cycle $s$. Moreover, the baseline function form of $f$ is linear, and we do not allow for the effect of $x_{c b t}$ to differ to the left and right of the threshhold. The reason for this choice is that making $f$ quadratic or allowing for differential trends on either side of the threshold barely makes a difference.

Another specification, based on treatment status at election cycle 4, is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{c b t}=\alpha_{b}+\alpha_{t}+\sum_{s=4}^{7} \beta_{s} \times(\text { Treat at cycle } 4)_{c b}+f\left(x_{c b 4}\right)+X_{c b t}^{\prime} \gamma+\epsilon_{c b t} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $(\text { Treat at cycle } 4)_{c b} \equiv$ Treat $_{c b 4}$, and $X_{c b t}$ denote control variables such as council size or the number of ward seats.

The outcomes we consider are the number of ward and PR candidates by gender. A factor to note is that when the outcome variable relates to the ward elections, we change the running variable to $\tilde{x}_{c b t} \equiv(\text { number of ward councilors })_{c b t}-(\text { number of ward councilors at the threshold })_{b}$,

[^7]for ease of interpretation ${ }^{11}$

### 4.2 Contemporaneous treatment vs. treatment at cycle 4

Equations (1) and (2) estimate the effects of contemporaneous treatment and initial treatment, respectively. In practice, there is barely any difference which specification we use, because the treatment status changes after election cycle 4 for only $3.7 \%$ of the councils. We settle on equation (2) as our main specification, though. The first reason is that the initial treatment assignment is more exogenous. Upon the first treatment, the treated and control municipalities may evolve on different paths, which would make them no longer balanced at the subsequent election cycles. Secondly, measuring the effect of the initial treatment maintains the same composition of treated municipalities. If the effect of contemporaneous treatment, specified by equation (1), varies over time, then it is unclear whether it is due to the small number of councils that are changing their treatment status, or due to the same councils reacting differently to the treatment over time. With equation (2), we can safely conclude that it is the latter.

### 4.3 Did the quota bite?

Because we are interested in the consequence of the change in the gender composition of councilors brought about by the quota, it is important to verify that there is a change in the number of female PR councilors at the discontinuity thresholds.

Table 3 reports the results of regressing (2) with the number of female PR councilors as the outcome variable, separately for each bin. While having an additional PR councilor at cycle 4 significantly increases the number of female PR councilors over all the cycles at bins 1 and 2, there is no such effect at bin 3. Moreover, there are very few observations at bin 3. The regression results of Table 3 are echoed by Figure 5, which shows that the average number of female PR councilors sharply increase at the thresholds of bins 1 and 2 , but not at bin 3. Therefore, in the reduced-form results that follow, we restrict the sample to bins 1 and 2.

[^8]We next focus on the treatment effect over time. In both columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, the effect of the treatment at cycle 4 remains similar over the election cycles. Because the vast majority ( $96.3 \%$ ) of the initially treated municipalities continue to get treated each cycle, the constancy in the coefficients implies that first-stage effect of the treatment - increasing the number of female PR councilors - is constant, too. This constancy implies that the effects on other outcome variables, i.e. the reduced-form treatment effects, should also be constant over time unless the initial treatment leads treatment and control groups on different paths.

The standard errors are clustered by municipality for two reasons. First, the variation of the initial treatment variable is at the level of the municipality. Second, parties formulate strategies chiefly within a municipality, rather than moving around candidates across municipalities. In fact, there are many factors that tie down a candidate to a certain municipality to be nominated in. A candidate is legally required to have been a resident of the municipality they are running in for at least 60 days prior to the election. In addition, as municipal councilors deal with local grass-roots matters, a candidate familiar with the municipality will win more votes ceteris paribus. Hence, a candidate usually runs in the municipality they have a connection with, such as their birthplace, long-term residence, or place of education. Moreover, the final say of a party's nomination lies on the head of the municipal branch of the party, so a candidate typically serves the local activities of the party in the municipality they desire to run in for a long time before getting nominated. Finally, once a candidate is nominated in a municipality, they put on a campaign and become known to the residents. So if they were to run again, they would not start over at a new location. For all these factors, rarely do parties move around candidates across municipalities for strategic reasons.

As a way to buttress the validity of the regression discontinuity design, Appendix Section C. 1 formally tests and confirms that as council size increases, there is a change in the number of female PR councilors only at the thresholds and at no other point.

## Table 3: The effect of an additional PR seat at election cycle 4 on the number of female PR councilors

|  | Number of female PR councilors |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Bin 1 | Bin 2 | Bin 3 |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | $0.84^{* * *}$ | $0.52^{* * *}$ | -0.23 |
|  | $(9.35)$ | $(2.82)$ | $(-0.42)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | $0.84^{* * *}$ | $0.32^{*}$ | 0.44 |
|  | $(12.28)$ | $(1.71)$ | $(1.21)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | $0.77^{* * *}$ | $0.58^{* * *}$ | 0.04 |
|  | $(10.18)$ | $(3.33)$ | $(0.10)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $0.77^{* * *}$ | $0.57^{* * *}$ | 0.16 |
|  | $(9.61)$ | $(3.68)$ | $(0.40)$ |
| Running variable form | council | council | council |
| $N$ | 670 | 198 | 33 |

Notes: This table reports the results of regressing (2), separately for each bin, with the number of female PR councilors as the outcome variable. t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

## Figure 5: The average number of female PR councilors by council size



Notes: The error bars indicate standard deviation of the number of female PR councilors by council size. Where the erroe bars are missing, there is only one municipality for that council size. Therefore, we can tell that there are only a small number of municipal councils belonging to bin 3 .

### 4.4 Validity of the regression discontinuity design

## Balance tests

A critical part of the identification strategy is that there are no confounders associated with the treatment status at election cycle 4 . We regress equation (2) for various predetermined characteristics, to check that they are balanced to the left and right of the threshold. The sample consists of councils at election cycle 4, and the regression results are presented in Table 4.

Panel (A) confirms that the population characteristics are balanced. In particular, the voting age population by gender is no different, alleviating the concern that the preference for female councilors among voters may be different between the treated and control municipalities. In Panel B, columns (8) and (9) refer to the vote share received by each main party in the previous election's PR arm. Columns (10) and (11) show that the initial treatment group is balanced in terms of economic prosperity and council performance. Columns (12) and (13) demonstrate that the structure of the ward election arm is balanced, as there is no difference in the number or size of wards between the treatment and control municipalities.

Table 4: Balance tests on pre-determined characteristics

|  | Panel A: Population characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Population |  | Voting age population |  |  | Households |  |
|  | Total <br> (1) | Foreign <br> (2) | Total <br> (3) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Male } \\ (4) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Female <br> (5) | Total <br> (6) | Foreign <br> (7) |
| Treat at cycle 4 | -23.97 | 0.01 | -17.22 | -7.84 | -9.38 | -5.59 | 0.01 |
|  | (-0.78) | (0.78) | (-0.76) | (-0.70) | (-0.82) | (-0.50) | (0.83) |
| Running variable | $31.49 * * *$ | -0.00 | 23.22*** | 11.29*** | 11.94*** | 10.66*** | -0.00 |
|  | (5.50) | (-0.84) | (5.47) | (5.38) | (5.55) | (5.15) | (-0.86) |
| Running variable form | council | council | council | council | council | council | council |
| $N$ | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 |

Panel B: Political leaning, economic, and ward division characteristics

|  | Past vote share by party |  | Budget |  | Ward characteristics |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Conservative <br> (8) | Progressive (9) | Total (10) | Council expenses <br> (11) | Num of wards (12) | Seats per ward (13) |
| Treat at cycle 4 | -0.02 | -0.00 | 54.16 | 0.02 | -0.23 | 0.17 |
|  | (-0.26) | (-0.12) | (0.63) | (0.36) | (-1.30) | (1.48) |
| Running variable | -0.00 | 0.00 | 19.04 | 0.06 *** | $0.45 * * *$ | -0.06** |
|  | (-0.08) | (0.08) | (1.30) | (7.84) | (11.71) | (-2.53) |
| Running variable form | council | council | council | council | ward | ward |
| $N$ | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 | 219 |

Notes: The regression specification follows equation (2), and the sample consists of bins 1 and 2 at election cycle 4. t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

## Bunching

Is there a possibility that there is gerrymandering? For example, a council may manipulate its constituent areas to manipulate the council's size and therefore, treatment status. If there is manipulation, one evidence of it would be bunching at the threshold. Figure 6 displays the histogram of the frequency of municipalities by council size. Visually, it is hard to say there is bunching around the thresholds of 11 and 12. In addition, it is difficult to formally test for bunching around the threshold, e.g. the McCrary (2008) density test, due to the coarseness in the council size variable ${ }^{[12}$ However, there are specific electoral rules against gerrymandering.

The division of election constituencies is determined by the Municipal Council Election Committee. The committee is set up in each district, and it consists of up to 11 members appointed by the district mayor among the individuals nominated by the media, legal community, academic community, civic groups, the district council, and District Election Committee. Municipal councilor or party member cannot be in the committee. The committee determines the council size based on population, administrative districts, topography, transportation, and other conditions. The committee cannot split the smallest administrative district and make it a part of another ward. In sum, there are rules preventing the membership of interested individuals in the committee and also rules circumscribing how the election constituencies are drawn up.

[^9]
## Figure 6: Histogram of council size



Notes: The sample includes all municipal councils of election cycles $4,5,6$, and 7 .

## 5 Main Results

### 5.1 The numbers of candidates and councilors by gender

The results of regressing equation (2) are reported in Table 5. The most interesting result is captured by columns (1) and (2). In response to the treatment at cycle 4, parties initially put up more male ward candidates but gradually decrease the number of male ward candidates. Eventually, at election cycle 7, the parties in the treated municipal councils put up fewer male candidates than those in untreated councils. As for female ward candidates, the opposite pattern holds: the coefficient sign changes from negative (albeit statistically insignificant) to positive. Thus, the way parties select candidates in reaction to the gender quota is changing over time.

Focusing next on the columns for the councilors, we can see that similarly, the number of female ward councilors in the treated municipalities is lower in the beginning but is higher at the end ${ }^{13}$ Moreover, the higher number of female PR councilors in the treated municipalities at election cycle 4 more than compensates for the lower number of female

[^10]ward councilors. Consequently, column (10) shows that there are statistically insignificantly more female councilors as a whole at election cycle 4 in the treated municipalities. Then, the coefficients for the later cycles grow in magnitude and become statistically significant.

Table 5: The effect of being past the threshold at election cycle 4
on the number of candidates and councilors

|  | All political parties |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Candidates |  |  |  | Councilors |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Ward |  | PR |  | Ward |  | PR |  | All |  |
|  | Male <br> (1) | Female <br> (2) | Male <br> (3) | Female <br> (4) | Male (5) | Female <br> (6) | Male <br> (7) | Female <br> (8) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Male } \\ (9) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Female $(10)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | $\begin{gathered} \hline 3.70^{* * *} \\ (3.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.24 \\ (-0.69) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.94^{* * *} \\ (4.27) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.96^{* * *} \\ (4.39) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.36^{*} \\ & (1.65) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.36^{*} \\ & (-1.65) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (1.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.76^{* * *} \\ (9.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.29 \\ & (-1.03) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.29 \\ & (1.03) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.56 \\ (0.61) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.49 \\ (1.37) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.63^{* * *} \\ (3.77) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.20^{* * *} \\ (5.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.28 \\ (-1.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (1.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (1.52) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.71^{* * *} \\ (9.23) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.88^{* * *} \\ & (-3.17) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.88^{* * *} \\ & (3.17) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | $\begin{aligned} & -1.39^{*} \\ & (-1.66) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.91^{* *} \\ (2.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.25^{*} \\ & (1.70) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.02^{* * *} \\ (4.66) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.47^{*} \\ & (-1.76) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.47^{*} \\ & (1.76) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (1.31) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.70^{* * *} \\ (8.89) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.06^{* * *} \\ & (-3.45) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.06^{* * *} \\ & (3.45) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $\begin{gathered} -2.23^{* *} \\ (-2.23) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.10^{* *} \\ & (2.49) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.21 \\ (1.35) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.27^{* * *} \\ (5.83) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.73^{* *} \\ (-2.50) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.73^{* *} \\ (2.50) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.61) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.69^{* * *} \\ (9.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.33^{* * *} \\ & (-3.99) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.33^{* * *} \\ & (3.99) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Running variable form $N$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { ward } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ward } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { council } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { council } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ward } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { ward } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { council } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { council } \\ 868 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { council } \\ & 868 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { council } \\ & 868 \end{aligned}$ |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation (2). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2 . t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; ${ }^{*} p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,^{* * *}$ $p<0.01$

What is driving the changing reaction to the gender quota? The parties in municipalities that got the initial treatment are changing their behaviors, becoming more female-friendly in their endorsement of candidates over time. A possible explanation is that that although parties countered the gender quota initially, the quota was not completely undone, as signified by the positive coefficient for cycle 4 in column (10). Then, the consequent experience of female councilors induced parties to become more favorable towards female councilors. Section 7 explores deeper into this learning story.

### 5.2 Focusing on candidates likely to get elected

Because the analysis is at the municipality level, it is not straightforward to pin down where the effects are coming from. Many parties operate in a municipality, and each party puts forth a large number of ward candidates per ward. The changes in the composition of the electoral body may not mean much if the change in the candidate selection pattern is driven by parties or candidates in positions that have no hope in getting elected. To explain the source of the changing candidate selection with greater clarity, we point to Table 6 .

Table 6 shows that even when we restrict our attention to candidates for whom election is probable, we see the same patterns of (a) the initial preference for males, and (b) the shift
in the preference for females. In this table, the sample is restricted to main parties only: the Conservative party and Progressive party ${ }^{14}$ Columns (1) and (2) reproduce Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 but for the main parties only. Columns (5) and (6) are even more selective; these are the candidates of the main parties, running as the candidates in the high-up positions on the ballot for the party in a ward (position 1 if the ward elects 1-2 councilors, and positions 1 and 2 if the ward elects $3-4$ councilors). These candidates have a great chance of getting elected.

Because political parties can choose how many candidates to champion, it is difficult to interpret the results in columns (1) and (2) together ${ }^{15}$ Column (4) reports how the number of female ward candidates compares between treatment and control municipalities, when the total number of ward candidates is no different. ${ }^{[16}$ Hence, column (4) looks at how the substitution between the two genders occurs, when the total number of candidates is preset. Again, there are fewer females in cycle 4, and gradually more females afterwards. The pattern is mirrored when we restrict the candidates to those in useful positions.

[^11]Table 6: The effect of being past the threshold at election cycle 4
on the number of ward candidates who are likely to get elected

|  | Main political parties only |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All ward positions |  |  |  | Useful ward positions |  |  |  |
|  | Male <br> (1) | Female <br> (2) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & (3) \end{aligned}$ | Female <br> (4) | Male <br> (5) | Female <br> (6) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & (7) \end{aligned}$ | Female <br> (8) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | $\begin{aligned} & 1.56^{*} \\ & (1.92) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (-1.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.31 \\ (1.52) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.43^{*} \\ (-1.95) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.51^{1 * * *} \\ (2.85) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.36^{*} \\ & (-1.91) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 1.15^{* *} \\ (2.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.54^{* * *} \\ (-2.92) \end{gathered}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.59 \\ (0.79) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.52^{* *} \\ (2.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.10 \\ (1.31) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.37^{*} \\ & (1.73) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.38 \\ (0.75) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.43^{* *} \\ & (2.32) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.81 \\ (1.49) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.31^{*} \\ & (1.81) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | $\begin{gathered} 0.90 \\ (1.22) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.83^{* * *} \\ (2.82) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.72^{* *} \\ & (2.11) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.60^{* *} \\ & (2.25) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.50 \\ (1.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.60^{* *} \\ (2.44) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.09^{* *} \\ & (2.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.43^{*} \\ & (1.94) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.29^{* * *} \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.35^{*} \\ & (1.74) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.11 * * * \\ (3.66) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.37 \\ (0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.73^{* * *} \\ (2.90) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.10^{* *} \\ & (2.11) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.56^{* *} \\ & (2.37) \end{aligned}$ |
| Total ward candidates |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} (8.13 * * * \\ (8.37) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.15^{* * *} \\ (7.88) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Running variable form | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward |
| $N$ | 867 | 867 | 867 | 867 | 867 | 867 | 867 | 867 |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation (22). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2 and is restricted to the two main parties. The number of observations is 867 instead of 868 since in one municipality main parties only have proportional candidates. Useful positions refer to candidates in the high-up positions on the ballot for the party in a ward (position 1 if the ward elects 1-2 councilors, and positions 1 and 2 if the ward elects $3-4$ councilors). t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

Table 7 uses a different way of gauging the election probability of candidates. It shows how parties select candidates for different types of wards. We categorize wards based on whether the party had a stronghold in the previous election, in which case we call the ward "safe. 17 These are wards where we can assume the party candidates have a very high probability of being elected. Since whether a ward is safe is dependent on the party at hand, the regressions in Table 7 are at the ward $\times$ party level. We can see in column (5) and (7) that parties had a strong preference for placing male candidates in safe wards in cycle 4 , especially in useful seats. The preference for men, however, disappears from the cycle 5 onward. Furthermore, we can see in columns (6) and (8) that, from cycle 5, parties in treatment municipalities started placing more women among candidates in unsafe wards. This is what is driving the overall increase the number of female candidates we observe at the municipality level. Therefore, although the number of female ward candidates increases faster over time in treatment than in control municipalities, the gains for women still remain bounded to the less-preferred wards with lower likelihood of election.

[^12]
# Table 7: The effect of being past the threshold at election cycle 4 on the number of ward candidates in safe and unsafe wards 

|  | Main political parties only, (ward $\times$ party)-level regressions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All ward positions |  |  |  |  |  | Useful ward positions |  |
|  | Male <br> (1) | Female <br> (2) | All <br> (3) | Female <br> (4) | Female Safe (5) | Female Unsafe (6) | Female Safe (7) | Female Unsafe (8) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.68) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.00 \\ (-0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.01 \\ (-0.40) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05^{* *} \\ (-2.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (-0.21) \end{gathered}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (-0.62) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07^{* *} \\ (2.34) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06^{* *} \\ (2.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (1.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10^{* * *} \\ (2.60) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.33) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10^{* * *} \\ (3.15) \end{gathered}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (-0.33) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.06^{*} \\ & (1.95) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.39) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.06^{*} \\ & (1.76) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (-0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10^{* * *} \\ (2.64) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (-0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06^{* *} \\ (2.05) \end{gathered}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (-0.96) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07^{* *} \\ (2.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (-0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07^{* *} \\ (2.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.70) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09^{* *} \\ (2.55) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (-0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (1.55) \end{gathered}$ |
| Total ward candidates |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.11^{* * *} \\ (10.17) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10^{* * *} \\ (7.05) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13^{* * *} \\ (9.10) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09^{* * *} \\ (4.55) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10^{* * *} \\ (4.22) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Running variable form | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward |
| $N$ | 6035 | 6035 | 6035 | 6035 | 2337 | 3698 | 2337 | 3698 |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation (22). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2 and is restricted to the two main parties. The level of observation is party ward. A ward is considered as safe for a party if the party wins the greatest vote share in the PR arm in the ward, and it got over 10 percentage points more vote share than the next popular party. Unsafe wards are all the others. t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

### 5.3 Placebo test

In the last sections, we found that parties reacted to the introduction of quotas in the PR arm by reducing the number of women among ward candidates immediately after the reform. The substitution away from women was stronger in ballot positions and wards where party candidates had higher chances at getting elected. However, from cycle 5, parties in municipalities above the threshold started placing more women among ward candidates.

Before going into the potential mechanisms that can explain the effects we observe, we report the result of a placebo test where we check that the thresholds are meaningful only after and not before the reform to the election system. This test provides supportive evidence that we are estimating the effect of the introduction of the quotas, and the results are not driven by treated municipalities being different from control municipalities ex-ante.

We test whether the number of male and female ward candidates changed at the threshold before and after the reform. We want to make sure that the probability of getting an additional PR seat upon the reform is not correlated with other factors that affect the number of male and female candidates, prior to the reform. Table 8 shows that up to election cycle 3 , the effect of being past the threshold is not statistically significantly distinguishable from
zero. It is at election cycle 4 that the treatment induces an effect, as expected.

## Table 8: The effect of being past the threshold on the number of male ward candidates

|  | Number of ward candidates |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Male | Female | Male | Female |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 1 | 0.92 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
|  | $(1.32)$ | $(0.26)$ | $(1.33)$ | $(0.31)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 2 | 0.40 | -0.05 | -0.61 | 0.03 |
|  | $(1.12)$ | $(0.24)$ | $(1.01)$ | $(0.30)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 3 | 1.06 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.15 |
|  | $(1.02)$ | $(0.27)$ | $(0.90)$ | $(0.32)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 4 | $3.22^{* * *}$ | $0.72^{* *}$ | $2.93^{* *}$ | $0.59^{* *}$ |
|  | $(1.21)$ | $(0.28)$ | $(1.15)$ | $(0.27)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 5 |  |  | -0.71 | $1.29^{* * *}$ |
|  |  |  | $(0.83)$ | $(0.31)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 6 |  |  | $-2.29^{* * *}$ | $1.58^{* * *}$ |
|  |  |  | $(0.79)$ | $(0.42)$ |
| Treat $\times$ Cycle 7 |  |  | $-2.79^{* * *}$ | $1.58^{* * *}$ |
|  |  |  | $(0.98)$ | $(0.44)$ |
| Running variable form | ward | ward | ward | ward |
| $N$ | 899 | 899 | 1577 | 1577 |

Notes: The running variable and treatment status are defined contemporaneously. While municipality size and divisions remained almost unchanged from cycle 4 onward, they changed dramatically during the first three election cycles. Thus, it would be inaccurate to define treatment for the first three cycles using cycle 4 municipality characteristics. The regression specification is given by equation (11) t-statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

## 6 Model on party learning

We argue that the main results are due to a mechanism of learning. Parties had initial beliefs about the competence of females that was biased down, but they gradually update their beliefs toward the truth as the quota induces greater exposure to female politicians. We use the model to formalize the conditions that support the learning mechanism, which we will find evidence of in Section 7 .

### 6.1 Model set-up

Parties $p=1, \ldots, P$ participate in a municipal council election in election cycle $t$. A party selects, from a group of prospective candidates, which candidates to put up for election. For the selected candidates, the party also allocates the candidates to different candidate positions, which are ranked by some historic probability of election. Prospective candidates
are of gender $g \in\{M, F\}$. Prospective candidate $i$ of gender $g$ has ability/competence:

$$
a_{i} \sim N\left(\mu_{g}, \sigma^{2}\right)
$$

The ability of a prospective candidate is unknown, but there is an observable signal of ability:

$$
s_{i}=a_{i}-\mu_{g}+\epsilon_{i}, \quad \epsilon_{i} \sim N\left(0, \sigma_{s}^{2}\right)
$$

which has a mean of 0 , and therefore is informative about the relative ability of $i$ within gender $g$.

Once candidate $i$ is elected and serves as councilor, the true ability of $i$ is revealed.

### 6.2 Voters' problem

Voters vote for parties as opposed to individual candidates ${ }^{18}$ A voter gets utility

$$
\iota_{p}+E\left(a_{p, t}\right)+h\left(f_{p, t}\right)
$$

from voting for party $p$ where $\iota_{p}$ is the inherent political preference of the voter for $p, a_{p, t}$ denotes the average ability of councilors in election cycle $t$ from party $p$, and $f_{p, t}$ is the share of female councilors from party $p . h($.$) is a strictly concave function which attains its$ maximum at $f_{t}^{*} \in(0,1)$. Voters believe that

$$
a_{p, t}=\pi a_{p, t-1}+u_{p, t}
$$

where $u_{p, t}$ is the error term with mean $0 . \pi>0$ because i) parties that successfully found high-ability councilors in the previous election cycle can select them again, and ii) voters expect parties that found high-ability councilors previously to learn faster on how to select more of such councilors. Voters therefore vote for party

$$
\arg \max _{p}\left\{\iota_{p}+\pi a_{p, t-1}+h\left(f_{p, t}\right)\right\}
$$

[^13]
### 6.3 Party's problem

A party has only one objective: to maximize the number of elected councilors from the party. Therefore, any forward-looking party expecting to participate in the election again in the future wants to maximize the average ability of councilors while achieving some gender ratio close to $f_{t}^{*}$.

### 6.4 Party beliefs

A party's prior belief about the value of $\mu_{g}$, before the election in election cycle $t$, follows a normal distribution with mean $\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}$, variance $\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2}$.

For a prospective candidate $i$ with signal $s_{i}$, the party expects $i$ 's ability to be

$$
\tilde{E}\left(a_{i} \mid s_{i}, g, t\right)=\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}} s_{i}
$$

where $\tilde{E}$ indicates expectation taken over the prior distribution.
The party selects candidates taking into account the value of $\tilde{E}\left(a_{i} \mid s_{i}, g, t\right)$; within gender, it chooses the prospective candidate with the highest value of $s_{i}$ first, then moves on to the one with the next highest value of $s_{i}$, etc.

Because the signals provide information on only the relative ability within gender, these signals are not informative about the value of $\mu_{g}$. Hence, the party cannot find out about the value of $\mu_{g}$ from the set of signals of the prospective candidates.

After the election, councilors start their term and their abilities $\mathbf{a}=\left\{a_{i}\right\}$ are revealed. Given the observed abilities, the party makes an inference about the value of $\mu_{g}$ via maximum likelihood. In doing so, parties use the fact that these councilors are positively selected out of the pool of prospective candidates; the councilors have previously received initial signals $\mathbf{s}=\left\{s_{i}\right\}$.

Conditional on $s_{i}$, the distribution of $a_{i}$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
a_{i} \left\lvert\, s_{i} \sim N\left(\mu_{g}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}} s_{i}, \frac{\sigma^{2} \sigma_{s}^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}}\right)\right. \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let's define $c=\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}}, m\left(s_{i}\right)=\mu_{g}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}} s_{i}=\mu_{g}+c s_{i}, \bar{\sigma}^{2}=\frac{\sigma^{2} \sigma_{s}^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}}$.

Then the likelihood function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}\left(\mu_{g}\right) & =P\left(\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{s} ; \mu_{g}\right) \\
& =\Pi_{i=1}^{n} f\left(a_{i} \mid s_{i} ; \mu_{g}\right) \quad \text { where } f: \text { Gaussian pdf } \\
& =\frac{1}{(\sqrt{2 \pi} \bar{\sigma})^{n}} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{2 \bar{\sigma}^{2}} \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(a_{i}-m\left(s_{i}\right)\right)^{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

The maximum likelihood estimator is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\hat{\mu}_{g}=\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(a_{i}-c s_{i}\right) \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

The distribution of $\hat{\mu}_{g}$ is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\hat{\mu}_{g} \sim N\left(\mu_{g}, \frac{1}{n} \bar{\sigma}^{2}\right) \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Call $V=\operatorname{Var}\left(\hat{\mu}_{g}\right)$. Then, the posterior distribution about the value of $\mu_{g}$ is normal with mean $\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}$ and variance $\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t+1}$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}=\frac{V \tilde{\mu}_{g, t}+\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2} \hat{\mu}_{g}}{V+\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2}} \\
\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t+1}^{2}=\frac{V \tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2}}{V+\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2}}
\end{gathered}
$$

### 6.5 Extension: if the exact ability of councilors is not revealed

What if the exact ability of councilors is not revealed while they serve their term? Rather, for councilor $i$, a party receives a second signal of ability that is highly informative about the absolute ability of $i$ :

$$
v_{i} \sim N\left(a_{i}, \sigma_{v}^{2}\right)
$$

where $\sigma_{v}^{2}$ is a small number. Moreover, say the precision of $v_{i}$ is inversely related to the closeness of the interaction between councilor $i$ and a party. For instance,

$$
\sigma_{v}^{2}= \begin{cases}\sigma_{1}^{2} & \text { if } i \text { belongs to own party } \\ \sigma_{2}^{2} & \text { else }\end{cases}
$$

with $\sigma_{1}^{2}<\sigma_{2}^{2}$.
Once the values of the second signals of ability of councilors, $\mathbf{v}=\left\{v_{i}\right\}$, are revealed, the
party makes an inference about the value of $\mu_{g}$ via maximum likelihood as before.
Conditional on $s_{i}$, the distribution of $v_{i}$ is

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i} \left\lvert\, s_{i} \sim N\left(\mu_{g}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}} s_{i}, \sigma_{v}^{2}+\frac{\sigma^{2} \sigma_{s}^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}}\right)\right. \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let's call $\bar{\sigma}_{1}^{2}=\sigma_{1}^{2}+\frac{\sigma^{2} \sigma_{s}^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}}$ and $\bar{\sigma}_{2}^{2}=\sigma_{2}^{2}+\frac{\sigma^{2} \sigma_{s}^{2}}{\sigma_{s}^{2}+\sigma^{2}}$. $N_{1}$ denotes the set of own-party councilors of size $n_{1}$, and $N_{2}$ the set of other councilors of size $n_{2}$.

The likelihood function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}\left(\mu_{g}\right) & =P\left(\mathbf{v} \mid \mathbf{s} ; \mu_{g}\right) \\
& =\Pi_{i \in N_{1}} f\left(v_{i} \mid s_{i} ; \mu_{g}, \sigma_{1}^{2}\right) \times \Pi_{i \in N_{2}} f\left(v_{i} \mid s_{i} ; \mu_{g}, \sigma_{2}^{2}\right) \\
& =\frac{1}{\left(\sqrt{2 \pi} \bar{\sigma}_{1}\right)^{n_{1}}} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{2 \bar{\sigma}_{1}^{2}} \sum_{i \in N_{1}}\left(v_{i}-m\left(s_{i}\right)\right)^{2}\right) \times \frac{1}{\left(\sqrt{2 \pi} \bar{\sigma}_{2}\right)^{n_{2}}} \exp \left(-\frac{1}{2 \bar{\sigma}_{2}^{2}} \sum_{i \in N_{2}}\left(v_{i}-m\left(s_{i}\right)\right)^{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Then the maximum likelihood estimator is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\hat{\mu}_{g}=\frac{\bar{\sigma}_{2}^{2} \sum_{i \in N_{1}}\left(v_{i}-c s_{i}\right)+\bar{\sigma}_{1}^{2} \sum_{i \in N_{2}}\left(v_{i}-c s_{i}\right)}{\bar{\sigma}_{2}^{2} n_{1}+\bar{\sigma}_{1}^{2} n_{2}} \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

The distribution of $\hat{\mu}_{g}$ is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\hat{\mu}_{g} \sim N\left(\mu_{g}, \frac{\bar{\sigma}_{1}^{2} \bar{\sigma}_{2}^{2}}{\bar{\sigma}_{2}^{2} n_{1}+\bar{\sigma}_{1}^{2} n_{2}}\right) \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

The posterior distribution about the value of $\mu_{g}$ follows the same structure as before.

### 6.6 Comparative statistics

Speed of updating
The speed of updating is given by

$$
\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}=\frac{\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2}}{V+\tilde{\sigma}_{g, t}^{2}}\left(\hat{\mu}_{g}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)
$$

- The larger the number of female councilors, the faster the updating:

$$
\frac{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)}{\partial n}>0, \frac{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)}{\partial n_{1}}>0, \frac{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)}{\partial n_{2}}>0
$$

- The larger the (downward) bias in the prior belief, the faster the updating:

$$
\frac{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)}{\partial \tilde{\mu}_{g, t}}<0
$$

- The higher the ability of female councilors, conditional on the signal, the faster the updating:

$$
\frac{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)}{\partial a_{i}}=\frac{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{g, t+1}-\tilde{\mu}_{g, t}\right)}{\partial \hat{\mu}_{g}} \frac{\partial \hat{\mu}_{g}}{\partial a_{i}}>0
$$

## Selection of candidates

- The larger the difference in the male and female prior mean $\left(\tilde{\mu}_{m, t}-\tilde{\mu}_{f, t}\right)$, the more men

$$
\frac{\partial\left[\tilde{E}\left(a_{i} \mid s_{i}, M, t\right)-\tilde{E}\left(a_{i} \mid s_{i}, F, t\right)\right]}{\partial\left(\tilde{\mu}_{m, t}-\tilde{\mu}_{f, t}\right)}>0
$$

(numerator: gap in the perceived ability of men and women with the same signal $s_{i}$ )

## 7 Evidence on learning about women's competence

In Section 6.6, we derive the conditions under which learning takes place faster. We connect these conditions to the empirical evidence and show that learning takes place faster in the treated municipalities.

### 7.1 Learning is faster where the ability of females is higher

If parties are learning about the competence of females, then the learning can be expected to take place at a faster rate if they are exposed to more competent females.

Following an approach commonly used in the literature, we exploit information on the education of the candidates as a proxy for competence ${ }^{19}$ We use this information to characterize what type of women gets elected in the first cycle after the introduction of quotas. We next examine how the treatment effects are different by the education level of the first female councilors of cycle 4. Panels A and B of Table 9 reproduce Table 5 for councils in which the female PR councilors of cycle 4 have below-median and above-median education levels, respectively. It is clear to see that the shift towards female candidates is more apparent and stronger when the first women are more educated. This evidence points to the story

[^14]of learning about the competence of females over time, and not one of a growing taste for women that would occur irrelevantly of ability.

Table 9: The effect of being past the threshold at election cycle 4 by education level of the first PR female councilors

|  |  |  |  | nel $A$ | low-m | an ed | tion |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Cand | dates |  |  |  | Coun | cilors |  |  |
|  |  | ad | P | R | Wa |  |  | R |  |  |
|  | Male <br> (1) | Female <br> (2) | Male <br> (3) | Female <br> (4) | Male (5) | Female <br> (6) | Male <br> (7) | Female (8) | Male (9) | Female (10) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | $\begin{gathered} 2.46 \\ (1.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.55 \\ (-0.94) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.33^{* * *} \\ (4.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.67^{* *} \\ & (2.06) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.53 \\ (1.33) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.53 \\ (-1.33) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.21^{*} \\ (1.66) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.61^{* * *} \\ (4.39) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.06 \\ & (0.12) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.06 \\ & (-0.12) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.33 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.47 \\ (0.75) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.94^{* * *} \\ (3.49) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.22^{* * *} \\ (3.34) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (-0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.96) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.67^{* * *} \\ (4.84) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.46 \\ & (-0.84) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.46 \\ & (0.84) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | $\begin{gathered} -1.04 \\ (-0.75) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.63 \\ (0.83) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.54^{* *} \\ (2.35) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ (1.47) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.17 \\ (-0.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.18 \\ (1.51) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.56^{* * *} \\ (3.77) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.59 \\ & (-1.03) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.59 \\ & (1.03) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $\begin{gathered} -1.90 \\ (-0.99) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.26 \\ (1.58) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.58^{*} \\ & (1.96) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.08^{* * *} \\ (3.32) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.57 \\ (-0.94) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.57 \\ (0.94) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.80) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.61^{* * *} \\ (4.33) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.05 \\ & (-1.50) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.05 \\ & (1.50) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Running variable form |  | ward | 387 | council | ward | ward | council | council | council | council |
| $N$ | $387$ | 387 |  | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | $387$ |
|  | Panel B: Above-median education level |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | $\begin{gathered} 4.03^{* * *} \\ (2.67) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.35) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.75^{* *} \\ (2.55) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.12^{* * *} \\ (3.80) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.11 \\ (0.41) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (-0.41) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.88^{* * *} \\ (8.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.71^{* *} \\ (-2.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.71^{* *} \\ & (2.08) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | $\begin{gathered} 0.49 \\ (0.39) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.72 \\ (1.56) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.56^{* * *} \\ (2.72) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.17^{* * *} \\ (4.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.64^{* *} \\ (-2.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.64^{* *} \\ (2.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.13^{*} \\ & (1.69) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.71^{* * *} \\ (7.83) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.30^{* * *} \\ & (-3.87) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.30^{* * *} \\ & (3.87) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | $\begin{gathered} -1.75 \\ (-1.48) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.27^{* *} \\ & (2.40) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.22 \\ (1.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.38^{* * *} \\ (4.55) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.77^{* *} \\ (-2.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.77^{* *} \\ & (2.24) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.78) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.77^{* * *} \\ (8.66) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.49 * * * \\ & (-3.87) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.49^{* * *} \\ & (3.87) \end{aligned}$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $\begin{aligned} & -2.44^{*} \\ & (-1.93) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.07^{*} \\ & (1.97) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.79) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.28^{* * *} \\ (4.38) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.88^{* * *} \\ (-2.66) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.88^{* * *} \\ (2.66) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.55) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.71^{* * *} \\ (7.68) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.57^{* * *} \\ & (-4.20) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.57^{* * * *} \\ & (4.20) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Running variable form N | $\begin{gathered} \text { ward } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ward } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { council } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { council } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ward } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ward } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { council } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { council } \\ 481 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { council } \\ & 481 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { council } \\ & 481 \end{aligned}$ |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation (2). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2 . $t$ statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,^{* * *}$ $p<0.01$

### 7.2 Learning is faster the closer the interaction with females and the greater the bias in the prior

In this section we explore whether the evidence is consistent with learning through exposure, i.e. parties learning about women's competence by experiencing female councilors.

To conduct this party-level analysis, we compare the strategies of parties that marginally won a PR councilor to those that marginally lost a PR councilor in the previous election. This comparison gives us the causal effect of having previously won a PR seat. In close electoral races in which the outcome of the election is uncertain, the winner is typically determined by factors that are beyond the control of parties and candidates, so which party
wins the seat can be considered as random (Lee, 2008).
We take marginal parties to be the two parties that either marginally won or lost the last PR seat for the municipality. In order to differentiate marginal winners from losers, we measure how far off the vote share received by a party was, from the share it needed to win that seat. For party $p$ in municipal council $c$ at election cycle $t$, this value is given by $v_{c p t} \equiv$ (vote share) $)_{c p t}-\bar{v}_{c p t}$, where $\bar{v}$ denotes the verdict-determining vote share. As the simplest example of $\bar{v}$, when two parties are competing for one PR seat, $\bar{v}=0.5$ for both parties. The precise way we compute $\bar{v}$ for all possible contest scenarios is detailed in Appendix Section D.1.

Figure 7: Marginal winners and losers of the last PR seat


Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the vote shares received by the two marginal parties competing for the last PR seat in a municipality. The vote share is computed to be the share of votes received among qualifying parties, i.e. parties that received more than $5 \%$ of the raw votes in the PR election arm.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of the vote shares received by the two marginal parties competing for the last PR seat in a municipality. The histogram shows that there are plenty of parties that received a vote share close to the share needed to win that seat. We employ a regression discontinuity design of the following form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{c p t}=\alpha_{n}+\alpha_{t}+\beta \times \text { Winner }_{c p, t-1}+f\left(v_{c p, t-1}\right)+X_{c p t}^{\prime} \gamma+\epsilon_{c p t} \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

where Winner $_{\text {cp,t-1 }} \equiv \mathbb{1}\left(v_{c p, t-1} \geq 0\right)$. We denote by $n \in\{1,2\}$, whether the marginal candidate that won - or nearly won - the last PR seat corresponds to the first or second PR candidate in a party's list. ${ }^{20} f\left(v_{c p, t-1}\right)$ is linear and allows for different slopes to the left and right of the cutoff $v_{c p, t-1}=0 . X_{c p t}$ represents the control variables, including the number of ward seats and the total council size for the contemporaneous election, i.e. election cycle $t$. A further factor to note is that the sample includes only the two major parties in South Korea, in order to track the parties over time. Due to frequent changes to party names, as well as frequent dissolutions and merges of small parties, parties other than the two major ones are difficult to follow over time. Therefore, $X_{c p t}$ also includes a dummy that indicates which of the two major parties party $p$ is.

When we consider marginal victories in the PR arm, we need to differentiate between the cases when the marginal candidate is in the first or second position in the party list ${ }^{21}$ If the marginal candidate is first on the list, then the candidate is necessarily a female, as enforced by the quota. However, if the marginal candidate is second on the list, the candidate might be male or female. Thus, when we consider close elections around a number-1 PR candidate, we are comparing parties that marginally won a woman in the previous election cycle with parties that didn't win any PR candidate. On the other hand, for close elections around a number-2 PR candidate, we are comparing parties that marginally won a second PR councilor to parties that only won one PR councilor.

We also distinguish between two different types of parties: those that placed men as the number-2 candidate in the party list and those that did not, in the previous election. As parties can place a candidate of any gender in even positions in their lists, the parties that place women in even positions are expected to have more gender-equal attitudes exante. Table 10 reports the result of regressing equation (9), when the marginal candidate is in position 1 or position 2 of the party list, and when the party lists a male or female second. We find positive coefficients on Winner in columns (1)-(4) of Panel A. Marginal winners put forth a higher female share among ward candidates in the following election cycle than marginal losers, when the marginal candidate is in the first position and when the party has a male as the number-2 PR candidate. Therefore, the positive coefficients imply that a party's strategy is affected by having a female councilor elected from within the party. This suggests that the learning effect is stronger when closer interactions with the woman take place. Furthermore, the fact that the effect is positive only when the the number-2 PR candidate is a male indicates that parties that displayed a prior preference

[^15]towards male candidates are those that update their beliefs on the competence of women, upon experiencing a female councilor. Winning the first woman does not affect a party's future gender preference if the party had a more gender-equal attitudes already.

Regarding Panel B - marginally winning the second PR seat, we are looking at parties that marginally won a man or a woman, depending on the gender of the candidate they placed in the second position of the ballot list ${ }^{22}$ We can see that experiencing a male councilor (Columns 1-4) does not trigger any effect on candidates' selection the following election cycle. This is reassuring as it confirms that what matters for learning is experiencing a female councilor. Regarding the effect of experiencing a second female councilor (Columns $5-8$ ), the results are harder to interpret. First, whether the party marginally won a woman in this case is endogenous and strongly correlated with initial preferences, as this happens only if a party placed a woman in the second position in the ballot list. We are looking here at parties that already had a preference towards women. Hence, according to the evidence in Panel A, we shouldn't expect any update in strategies. Moreover, in this case, we are comparing parties that experience two female councilors to parties that experience only one female councilor. It is not straightforward that experiencing an additional female councilor would have the same effect as the first one.

[^16]Table 10: Marginally winning a PR councilor in the previous election

| Panel A: Position of marginal candidate: 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Female share among party's ward candidates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Gender of second position: male |  |  |  | Gender of second position: female |  |  |  |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Winner | 0.07* | 0.08* | 0.10* | $0.21^{* * *}$ | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.02 | -0.04 |
|  | (1.73) | (1.73) | (1.81) | (3.09) | (0.04) | (0.33) | (-0.20) | (-0.23) |
| Bandwidth ( $\left\|v_{\text {cpt }}\right\|$ ) | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.05 |
| $N$ | 297 | 231 | 157 | 84 | 104 | 70 | 49 | 24 |

Panel B: Position of marginal candidate: 2
Female share among party's ward candidates
Gender of second position: male Gender of second position: female

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |  | $(5)$ | $(6)$ | $(7)$ | $(8)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Winner | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | -0.05 |  | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0.05 |
|  | $(0.26)$ | $(0.68)$ | $(0.92)$ | $(-1.17)$ |  | $(-0.31)$ | $(-0.21)$ | $(-0.84)$ | $(-0.72)$ |
| Bandwidth $\left(\left\|v_{c p t}\right\|\right)$ | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.05 |  | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.05 |
| $N$ | 113 | 84 | 69 | 33 |  | 98 | 75 | 62 | 33 |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation (9). The Mean Square Error-optimal bandwidth is selected (Calonico et al. 2014). The standard errors remain very similar when they are clustered at the municipality level. t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality $\times$ party in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.

### 7.3 Alternative mechanism 1: no learning, but mere change in the size of the pool of qualified women

Even if there is absolutely no learning, the patterns that we see in the number of female candidates and councilors could be consistent with the initial shortage and gradual growth of qualified or experienced women. We provide evidence that this mechanism cannot be the whole story.

First of all, for the treatment effect of fewer female ward candidates in cycle 4 to be explained by a shortage of women, we should find that parties in treatment municipalities have greater trouble finding female candidates. We test this hypothesis. A party is defined as constrained if the number of female candidates in its party list is smaller or equal to the number of women it needs to list as candidates due to quotas. ${ }^{233}$ Table 11 shows that parties above the threshold do not appear to be significantly more constrained in the number of women they can list as candidates in cycle 4.

[^17]Table 11: Probability of being constrained in the number of female candidates

|  | $\operatorname{Pr}($ constrained $)$ |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | -0.02 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
|  | $(-0.46)$ | $(1.19)$ | $(1.27)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | -0.02 | -0.09 | $-0.12^{*}$ |
|  | $(-0.49)$ | $(-1.19)$ | $(-1.65)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.04 |
|  | $(-0.89)$ | $(-0.33)$ | $(-0.69)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | -0.00 | -0.08 | -0.10 |
|  | $(-0.05)$ | $(-1.18)$ | $(-1.38)$ |
| Running variable from | council | council | council |
| Sample | all parties | main parties | main parties in ward arm |
| $N$ | 3795 | 1557 | 1520 |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation (2). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2. A party is defined as constrained if the number of female candidates in the party's list is smaller or equal to the number of women the party is obliged to place in its list due to quotas. In column (1), all parties are included; column (2) includes only the two main parties; in column (3) the sample is restricted to only the main parties in municipalities where the parties have at least one ward candidate. t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

Secondly, if the only reason for the treatment effect of rising number of female ward candidates over cycles 5 through 7 was the greater availability of experienced female candidates, then there should be no shift in the gender preference among candidates who have zero councilor experience. However, Table 12 shows that the initial withdrawal of female candidates and the gradual reversal is present even for ward candidates who have never been elected before. Hence, the greater availability of experienced women in treated municipalities after the introduction of the quotas cannot be the only reason driving the changing reaction. In addition, even if every municipality had women in its parliament in cycle 4 thanks to the introduction of the quota, the number of female councilors was still very small and so it cannot account for all the rise in the female candidates over time.

## Table 12: The effect of being past the threshold at election cycle 4 on the number of rookie ward candidates

|  | Rookie ward candidates |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Male | Female |
|  | $(9)$ | $(10)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 4 | 0.82 | $-0.27^{*}$ |
|  | $(1.33)$ | $(-1.66)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | -0.63 | 0.01 |
|  | $(-1.05)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | -0.29 | 0.15 |
|  | $(-0.57)$ | $(0.84)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | -0.45 | $0.38^{*}$ |
|  | $(-0.86)$ | $(1.82)$ |
| Running variable form | ward | ward |
| $N$ | 868 | 868 |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation 22. The sample includes only bins 1 and $2 . \mathrm{t}$ statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

### 7.4 Alternative mechanism 2: shift in voter taste for females

The observed gradual increase in the number of female candidates could be explained by parties responding to a change in voters' attitudes towards women. Voters might be the ones learning about women's competence after experiencing female councilors. Hence, parties could nominate female candidates for reasons not directly related to them learning about their competence, but to strategically adapt their strategies to follow voters' preferences.

In order to test whether this is the case, we follow Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) and we compare the gender gap in votes received by candidates in treated and control municipalities over time. We modify Specification (2) to perform the following analysis at the candidate level:

$$
\begin{align*}
& Y_{i c b t}=\alpha_{b}+\alpha_{t}+\beta_{1} \text { Treat }_{c b 4}+\beta_{2} \text { Female }_{i} \times \text { Treat }_{c b 4}+\beta_{3} \text { Female }_{i}+ \\
& \sum_{s=5}^{7}\left[\beta_{1, s} \text { Treat }_{c b 4}+\beta_{2, s} \text { Female }_{i} \times \text { Treat }_{c b 4}+\beta_{3, s} \text { Female }_{i}\right]+f\left(x_{c b 4}\right)+X_{c b t}^{\prime} \gamma+X_{i c b t}^{\prime} \delta+\epsilon_{c b t} \tag{10}
\end{align*}
$$

where Treat $_{c b 4}$ is treatment defined based on treatment status at election cycle $4, X_{c b t}$ denotes a vector of control variables such as the contemporaneous number of ward seats, while $X_{i c p t}$ indicates individual-level controls, including the party of affiliation, the position of the candidate in the ballot list, a dummy for candidates having previous or current occupations related to politics, education level, and a dummy indicating whether the candidate was
previously elected. The outcome we consider is the vote share the candidate obtained in ward elections. As the outcome variable relates to the ward elections, the running variable is $\tilde{x}_{c b t} \equiv(\text { number of ward councilors })_{c b t}-(\text { number of ward councilors at the threshold })_{b}$, as explained above.

Table 13 shows the results of the analysis. Columns (1) to (3) displays the estimates of a specification where we gradually add controls. Columns (1) includes only the number of ward seats for the contemporaneous election. Column (2) includes also a control for the position on the ballot and the party of affiliation, while in Column (3) we present the results of the full specification, which includes also controls for individual characteristics. Lastly, Columns (4) and (5) present the results of Specification (10), the same as Column (3), splitting the sample between useful position in the ballot (high-up positions on the ballot for the party in a ward - position 1 if the ward elects 1-2 councilors, and positions 1 and 2 if the ward elects 3-4 councilors) and further positions.

If parties react to a quota-induced change in voters' attitudes towards women, we expect the gender gap in votes obtained by candidates in treated municipalities to close over time compared to the gender gap of candidates with comparable characteristics, placed in the same ballot position in control municipalities. Considering that this is a repeated game, parties' expectations can be mislead in the first interaction, but we would expect them to learn over time observing the results of previous elections. Hence, in order for the faster increase over time in female candidates in treated municipality compared to control municipalities to be completely explained by parties putting forth more women to attract votes, we should see evidence of a reduction in the gender gap in vote share over time.

However, looking at Columns (3) - (5) we can see that this is not the case. A gender gap in vote share exists, but this is significant only in Cycle 4, and only for women in positions further down the ballot list. Furthermore, the gender gap does not evolve over time, and there is no difference in the gender gap in vote share nor its evolution for candidates in treated compared to control municipalities.

Table 13: Evolution of voters' preferences

|  | Candidate's vote share in the ward election arm (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No controls <br> (1) | Ballot position (2) | Individual characteristics <br> (3) | Useful positions <br> (4) | Further positions (5) |
| Female | 0.475 | -0.696 | -1.412 | -0.524 | -3.732*** |
|  | (1.058) | (0.972) | (0.912) | (1.231) | (0.931) |
| Female $\times$ Cycle 5 | -0.645 | -1.588 | -1.382 | -2.153 | 0.183 |
|  | (1.311) | (1.132) | (1.117) | (1.534) | (1.201) |
| Female $\times$ Cycle 6 | -1.445 | -1.748* | -1.367 | -1.731 | -0.937 |
|  | (1.163) | (0.994) | (0.976) | (1.299) | (1.279) |
| Female $\times$ Cycle 7 | 1.696 | 1.585 | 1.873* | 1.471 | 0.790 |
|  | (1.216) | (1.152) | (1.101) | (1.461) | (1.352) |
| Treat at cycle 4 | -2.115** | -2.015** | $-2.107^{* * *}$ | -1.833* | -0.981 |
|  | (1.053) | (0.816) | (0.804) | (0.933) | (0.802) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 5 | 0.107 | 0.217 | 0.467 | 0.355 | 0.439 |
|  | (0.619) | (0.551) | (0.539) | (0.527) | (0.752) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 6 | 0.903 | 0.918 | 0.978 | 0.920 | 0.447 |
|  | (0.735) | (0.629) | (0.635) | (0.646) | (0.867) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Cycle 7 | $1.283$ | $1.142^{*}$ | $1.043$ | $0.906$ | $-0.071$ |
|  | $(0.796)$ | (0.638) | (0.638) | (0.673) | $(0.835)$ |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Female | -1.183 | 0.435 | 0.547 | 0.889 | 0.586 |
|  | (1.870) | (1.544) | (1.531) | (2.024) | (1.222) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Female $\times$ Cycle 5 | 2.078 | -0.594 | -0.994 | -1.109 | -1.551 |
|  | (2.083) | (1.653) | (1.650) | (2.193) | (1.680) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Female $\times$ Cycle 6 | 1.595 | -0.390 | -0.389 | -0.916 | -0.548 |
|  | (1.876) | (1.531) | (1.558) | (2.089) | (1.685) |
| Treat at cycle $4 \times$ Female $\times$ Cycle 7 | 0.569 | -0.937 | -0.975 | -1.236 | -0.783 |
|  | (2.088) | (1.730) | (1.702) | (2.193) | (1.739) |
| $N$ | 11246 | 11246 | 10798 | 7737 | 3061 |
| Running variable form | ward | ward | ward | ward | ward |
| Ballot Position | X | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Education Level (0-12) | X | X | Y | Y | Y |
| Rookie vs Incumbent | X | X | Y | Y | Y |
| Political Experience | X | X | Y | Y | Y |

Notes: The regression specification is given by equation 10 . t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality $\times$ election cycle in parentheses; ${ }^{*} p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.

## 8 Conclusion

This paper highlights that with time, affirmative action policies can still be effective despite an initial backlash, as long as the policies are not completely undone. Moreover, such is the case even in settings where the target group consists of a very small minority among the incumbents. Through exposure to the minority group, the policies provide incumbents with
an opportunity to learn about the competence of the minority group. Once the learning takes off, the policy itself might be unneeded.

Gender quotas are needed not for equal representation's sake, but also from an efficiency standpoint. If informational failure leads to suboptimally low numbers of female politicians, quotas play a role in rectifying this source of inefficiency.

Although gender quotas in parliaments have been adopted broadly worldwide, there are still many countries that have none in place, such as Egypt, India, Liberia, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. Unsurprisingly, these countries also suffer from low levels of female representation in national parliaments. The South Korean setting of this paper is unique in that it studies the effect of a gender quota in the legislative body from a starting point of practically zero women. Therefore, this paper is informative about the effect of gender quotas where they are most needed.

What remains to be crystallized is exactly which aspect of women's competence parties are learning about. As of yet, we do not know whether it is their election campaign skills, their loyalty to the party, their keenness as legislators, or their ability to meet the demands of the electorate, that the parties update their beliefs on. Further evidence is needed in this direction.

This paper is a part of a bigger agenda that attempts to study how a gender quota might trigger a gradual process of learning in favor of women. To tackle the precise mechanisms through which the learning takes place, we plan to study in future work the specific interactions among councilors recorded in the transcripts of council meetings.

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## Appendix A Figures

Figure A1: Female share in national parliaments and attitudes towards women (2017-2022)


Notes: Sources:(i) Attitudes towards women - World Values Survey, 2017-2021 European Values Survey, 2017-2022; (ii) Share of seats held by women in national parliaments - World Bank Gender Statistics, latest data available between 2021-2018; (iii) Gender quotas in national parliaments - International IDEA Gender Quotas Database, last updated June 2022

## Figure A2: Female share in national parliaments and attitudes towards women

 (1995-2004)

Notes: Sources - Attitudes towards women: World Values Survey waves 3 (1995-1998) and 4 (1999-2004); Share of seats held by women in national parliaments: World Bank Gender Statistics, average years 19952004.

Figure A3: Female representation on boards in listed companies and attitudes towards women (2017-2022)


Notes: Sources: All countries - Attitudes: World Values Survey, wave 7 (2017-2022); Share of women on boards in listed companies: ORBIS, 2022. South Korea - Attitudes: World Values Survey, waves 3 (1996) and 4 (2001); Share of women in national parliaments: World Bank Gender Statistics, average years 1997-2001.

## Appendix B Tables

Table A1: The allocation of Proportional Representation seats across parties

|  | Councils by the number of PR seats |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 PR seat | 2 PR seats |  | 3 PR seats |  |  |
|  | N. Percent. | N. | Percent. | N. | Percent. |  |
| Election Cycle 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 Party | 117 | $100 \%$ | 15 | $17.86 \%$ | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Parties | 0 | 0 | 69 | $82.14 \%$ | 15 | $83.33 \%$ |
| 3 Parties | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | $16.67 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Election Cycle 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 Party | 117 | $100 \%$ | 5 | $6.02 \%$ | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Parties | 0 | 0 | 78 | $93.98 \%$ | 13 | $72.22 \%$ |
| 3 Parties | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | $27.78 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Election Cycle $\mathbf{6}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 Party | 110 | $100 \%$ | 18 | $20.22 \%$ | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Parties | 0 | 0 | 71 | $79.78 \%$ | 17 | $100 \%$ |
| 3 Parties | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Election Cycle $\mathbf{7}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 Party | 105 | $100 \%$ | 9 | $9.89 \%$ | 1 | $4.35 \%$ |
| 2 Parties | 0 | 0 | 82 | $90.11 \%$ | 18 | $94.74 \%$ |
| 3 Parties | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | $5.26 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | $\mathbf{4 4 9}$ |  | $\mathbf{3 4 7}$ |  | $\mathbf{7 2}$ |  |

Notes: The sample is restricted to bins 1 and 2, i.e. to municipal councils with up to 25 councilors.

Table A2: Candidates and councilors' party affiliation

|  | N | Candidates |  |  |  | Councilors |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Direct |  | Proportional |  | Direct |  | Proportional |  |
|  |  | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std |
| Election Cycle 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 226 | 1 | 0 |  |  | 1 | 0 |  |  |
| Election Cycle 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 228 | 1 | 0 |  |  | 1 | 0 |  |  |
| Election Cycle 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 228 | 1 | 0 |  |  | 1 | 0 |  |  |
| Election Cycle 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 230 | 0.41 | 0.15 | 0 | 0 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0 | 0 |
| Progressive party | 230 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.29 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.25 |
| Conservative party | 230 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.47 | 0.30 | 0.54 | 0.31 | 0.64 | 0.38 |
| Election Cycle 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 228 | 0.32 | 017 | 0 | 0 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0 | 0 |
| Progressive party | 228 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.41 | 0.39 |
| Conservative party | 228 | 0.33 | 0.18 | 0.49 | 0.31 | 0.43 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0.40 |
| Election Cycle 6 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 227 | 0.34 | 0.16 | 0 | 0 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0 | 0 |
| Progressive party | 227 | 0.24 | 0.16 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.37 |
| Conservative party | 227 | 0.36 | 0.18 | 0.55 | 0.30 | 0.49 | 0.26 | 0.59 | 0.38 |
| Election Cycle 7 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 226 | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0 | 0 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0 | 0 |
| Progressive party | 226 | 0.32 | 0.12 | 0.43 | 0.20 | 0.54 | 0.21 | 0.66 | 0.33 |
| Conservative party | 226 | 0.29 | 0.16 | 0.38 | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.20 | 0.33 | 0.33 |

## Appendix C Identification

## C. 1 Confirming that the number of female PR councilors changes only at the thresholds

In order to buttress the regression discontinuity design, we test whether there is a change in the number of female PR councilors as council size increases, at points other than the thresholds. We regress, for each value of $x \in\{-4,-3, \ldots, 3,4\}$ i.e. distance from the threshold,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { (number of female PR councilors) }_{c b t}=\beta \times \text { TreatOne }_{c b t}+\delta_{b}+\gamma_{t}+\epsilon_{c b t} \tag{11}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\text { where TreatOne } e_{c b t}= \begin{cases}1, & \text { if }(\text { council size })_{c b t}=x \\ 0, & \text { if }(\text { council size })_{c b t}=x-1\end{cases}
$$

Equation (11), therefore, estimates the change in the number of female PR councilors when the council size increases by 1 , for all points around the threshold. Table A3 reports the results. It confirms that there is a positive effect only at the threshold.

Table A3: The effect of an increase in council size on the number of female PR councilors

|  | $x$ value |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -4 | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |  |
| Coefficient $(\hat{\beta})$ | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.03 | -0.01 | $0.92^{* * *}$ | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.09 |  |
| Standard error | $(-0.36)$ | $(1.32)$ | $(-0.99)$ | $(-0.20)$ | $(15.00)$ | $(-0.14)$ | $(-0.36)$ | $(-0.35)$ | $(1.04)$ |  |
| $N$ | 267 | 380 | 210 | 170 | 168 | 150 | 136 | 111 | 87 |  |

Notes: This table reports the results of regression equation (11). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2. t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; ${ }^{*} p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,^{* * *}$ $p<0.01$

## C. 2 Robustness to bandwidth choice

Table A4: The effect of being past the threshold on the number of candidates and councilors, for various bandwidths

|  | Candidates |  |  |  | Councilors |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Ward |  | PR |  | Ward |  | PR |  | All |  |
|  | Male <br> (1) | Female (2) | Male <br> (3) | Female (4) | Male <br> (5) | Female (6) | Male <br> (7) | Female (8) | Male <br> (9) | Female (10) |
| Panel A: distance ${ }^{\dagger} \leq 4$ <br> Treat | $\begin{gathered} 0.37 \\ (0.46) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31 \\ (0.94) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.58^{* * *} \\ (4.64) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.23^{* * *} \\ (8.29) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (-0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09^{* *} \\ (1.97) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.91^{* * *} \\ (19.58) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (-0.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.06 * * * \\ (4.78) \end{gathered}$ |
| $N$ | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 | 868 |
| Panel B: distance $\leq 3$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Treat | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33 \\ (0.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.51^{* * *} \\ (3.77) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.24^{* * *} \\ (7.95) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (-0.59) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.59) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (1.57) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.92^{* * *} \\ (17.77) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (-0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.04^{* * *} \\ (4.48) \end{gathered}$ |
| $N$ | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 | 811 |
| Panel $C$ : distance $\leq 2$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Treat | $\begin{gathered} 0.89 \\ (0.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.37 \\ (1.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.54^{* * *} \\ (3.59) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.29^{* * *} \\ (7.50) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.13 \\ (-0.59) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.59) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (1.33) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.92 * * * \\ (16.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (-0.23) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.06^{* * *} \\ (4.16) \end{gathered}$ |
| $N$ | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 |
| Panel D: distance $\leq 1$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Treat | $\begin{gathered} 0.34 \\ (0.34) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ (1.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.61^{* * *} \\ (3.55) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.25^{* * *} \\ (6.66) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.24 \\ (-0.94) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.94) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (1.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.91^{* * *} \\ (14.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (-0.53) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.15^{* * *} \\ (4.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| $N$ | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 | 320 |
| Panel E: distance $=0$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Treat | $\begin{gathered} 0.38 \\ (0.37) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.42 \\ (1.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.58^{* * *} \\ (3.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.23^{* * *} \\ (6.53) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.24 \\ (-0.91) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.91) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (1.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.92^{* * *} \\ (15.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.16 \\ (-0.55) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.16^{* * *} \\ (3.99) \end{gathered}$ |
| $N$ | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 |

Notes: This table reports the results of regression equation (11). The sample includes only bins 1 and 2.
$\dagger$ Distance refers to the distance to the threshold. To illustrate, the council sizes for which distance equals 0 are $10,11,20$, and 21 , while the council sizes for which distance equals 1 are $9,12,19$, and 22 . t statistics from standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * $p<0.10,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$

## Appendix D Computational details

## D. 1 Computing the running variable in the regression discontinuity design of section 7.2

The purpose of the regression discontinuity design of section 7.2 is to compare the strategies of parties that marginally won a PR councilor to those that marginally lost a PR councilor
in the previous election. Thus, we are interested in the causal effect of having won a female PR councilor. We take marginal parties to be the two parties that either marginally won or lost the last PR seat. In order to differentiate marginal winners from losers, we measure how far off the vote share received by a party was, from the share it needed to win that seat. The running variable for party $p$ in municipal council $c$ at election cycle $t$ equals $v_{c p t}=$ voteshare $_{c p, t-1}-\bar{v}_{c p, t-1}$, where $\bar{v}$ denotes the verdict-determining vote share.

To compute $\bar{v}$, we first need to describe the rules by which PR seats get allocated:

## $\underline{\text { Rules for allocating PR seats }}$

1. Among parties running for prop rep in a municipality, only the parties getting $>=5 \%$ of votes qualify.
2. Of the qualifying parties, first compute $X=$ (number of prop MP seats in the municipality $) \times($ vote share of each qualifying party).
3. Allocate to each qualifying party the number of seats equal to the integer part of $X$.
4. Allocate the remaining seats by the ranking of the decimal part of $X$.
E.g. Municipal council A has 3 PR seats. There are 3 parties (1, 2, and 3) running for proportional representation. The vote shares of the parties are: party 1: $60 \%$, $2: 38 \%$, and $3: 2 \%$. Party 3 got less than $5 \%$, so it does not qualify. Among the qualifying parties, the vote shares are then party $1: 60 /(60+38) \approx 61.22 \%$, and $2: 38 /(60+38) \approx 38.77 \%$. The values of $X$ 's are party $1: 3 \times 0.6122 \approx 1.83$, and $2: 3 \times 0.3877 \approx 1.16$. Parties 1 and 2 both have 1 in the integer part of $X$, so they first get one PR councilor each. The last PR seat goes to party 1, because $0.83>0.16$.

Below, we compute $\bar{v}$ for all possible contest scenarios. ${ }^{24}$ While doing so, we distinguish whether the marginal candidate that won - or nearly won - the last PR seat corresponds to the first, second, or third PR candidate in a party's list. For notational convenience, we call $s$ the position in the party list of the marginal candidate of a party, and $V$ the sum of the vote shares (among qualifying parties) received by the two marginal parties.

[^18](1) When there is one PR seat in the municipality
i) The two most popular parties contest over the only PR seat. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 2
$-\operatorname{Rank} 1: \bar{v}=\frac{V}{2}, s=1$
$-\operatorname{Rank} 2: \bar{v}=\frac{V}{2}, s=1$
2 When there are two PR seats in the municipality
i) The contest is over whether the rank-2 party wins the second PR seat. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 2

- Rank 1: $\bar{v}=\frac{2 V+1}{4}, s=2$
- Rank 2: $\bar{v}=\frac{2 V-1}{4}, s=1$

3 When there are three PR seats in the municipality
i) The contest is over whether the third PR seat goes to the rank-1 party or the rank-2 party. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 2

- Rank 1: $\bar{v}=\frac{3 V+2}{6}, s=3$
- Rank 2: $\bar{v}=\frac{3 V-2}{6}, s=1$
ii) Where the rank-2 party wins a seat for sure, the contest is over whether the third PR seat goes to the rank-1 party or the rank-3 party. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 3
$-\operatorname{Rank}$ 1: $\bar{v}=\frac{3 V+1}{6}, s=2$
$-\operatorname{Rank} 3: \bar{v}=\frac{3 V-1}{6}, s=1$
4 When there are four PR seats in the municipality
i) The contest is over whether the fourth PR seat goes to the rank-1 party or the rank-2 party. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 2
$-\operatorname{Rank} 1: \bar{v}=\frac{4 V+3}{8}, s=4$
$-\operatorname{Rank} 2: \bar{v}=\frac{4 V-3}{8}, s=1$
ii) Where the rank-1 party wins two seats for sure and the rank-2 party wins a seat for sure, the contest is over whether the fourth PR seat goes to the rank-1 party or the rank- 2 party. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 2
$-\operatorname{Rank} 1: \bar{v}=\frac{4 V+1}{8}, s=3$
$-\operatorname{Rank} 3: \bar{v}=\frac{4 V-1}{8}, s=2$
iii) Where the rank-1 party wins two seats for sure and the rank-2 party wins a seat for sure, the contest is over whether the fourth PR seat goes to the rank-2 party or the rank- 3 party. Marginal parties: ranks 2 and 3
- Rank 2: $\bar{v}=\frac{4 V+1}{8}, s=2$
- Rank 3: $\bar{v}=\frac{4 V-1}{8}, s=1$
iv) Where the rank-2 and rank-3 parties win a seat each for sure, the contest is over whether the fourth PR seat goes to the rank-1 party or the rank-4 party. Marginal parties: ranks 1 and 4
- Rank 1: $\bar{v}=\frac{4 V+1}{8}, s=2$
- Rank 4: $\bar{v}=\frac{4 V-1}{8}, s=1$

As an example, take the case of the rank-1 party in a municipality with two PR seats and two qualifying parties. The party's $\bar{v}=0.75$, according to the computation given above. Indeed, Figure A4 shows that among such rank-1 parties, those receiving a vote share greater than 0.75 win two PR councilors whereas those receiving a vote share below 0.75 win one PR councilor.

Figure A4: Marginal winners and losers of the last PR seat, among rank-1 parties in municipalities with two PR seats and two qualifying parties


Notes: This figure shows that in municipalities with two PR seats and two qualifying parties, the rank-1 parties must receive a vote share greater or equal to 0.75 in order to win both PR seats. The reason the vote share received is always greater than 0.5 is because these parties are the rank- 1 parties. Note that the vote share is the share of votes among qualifying parties only.


[^0]:    *This research is supported by the STICERD research grant, a grant of the French National Research Agency (ANR), "Investissements d'Avenir" (LabEx Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047).
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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ Parties, in particular party leaders, determine the set of candidates running for election. The case is obvious for the PR arm, because one cannot be elected without being a member of a party in that arm. However, also in the ward arm, it is the parties that nominate the candidates to run for election. It is possible that a candidate runs as an independent, but very rarely he or she will win.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ See Figure A1 in the Appendix for data on female representation in national parliaments and attitudes.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ A sizable body of papers study the impact of quotas - and more generally female representation on women's political presence and empowerment (e.g. Baltrunaite et al., 2019, Baskaran and Hessami, 2018; Bhalotra et al. 2018, Brollo and Troiano, 2016, Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015 |Beaman et al., 2009|), competence/quality of future candidates and elected politicians (for example, Bagues and Campa, 2021 Bagues and Campa, 2020, Besley et al. 2017, Baltrunaite et al. 2014), and allocation of public expenditure (Lippmann| 2022||Bagues and Campa|, 2021||Braga and Scervini, 2017, Rigon and Tanzi, 2012, Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014| Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004| Clots-Figueras, 2012| etc.).
    ${ }^{4}$ For example, Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) show that Spanish party leaders, historically men, place fewer women in their lists and preferably in positions with lower chances of success. A behavior that persists also after the introduction of gender quotas. In the same direction, Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) show that Spanish parties most affected by a gender quota significantly improved their electoral performance, suggesting that parties were fielding fewer women at the expense of lowering votes, not maximizing their performance before the quota. Or else, Besley et al. (2017) study how the competence of elected politicians is affected by a zipper quota in Sweden. Under the lenses of a model where party leaders choose the competence of politicians on the ballot to trade off electoral success against their own survival, gender quotas could be perceived as a threat to the survival of incumbent leaders, who were predominantly male, as it could bring an increase in the pool of competent followers.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ The maximum number of candidates a party could nominate for a ward equalled the preset number of seats for that ward.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ General election districts are divided depending on population size and local representativeness. A large

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ In the latest general election of 2020 , where the same gender quota on the PR arm applies, almost all PR candidates in positions 2, 4 , and 6 are male.

[^7]:    ${ }^{9}$ Table 2 shows that among PR councilors, $87 \%$ to $98 \%$ are female each election.
    ${ }^{10}$ Appendix Table A1 shows that it is relatively rare to find multiple PR seats getting allocated to the same party.

[^8]:    ${ }^{11}$ If we keep the running variable based on council size, then the regression estimates the effect of Treat $=$ 1, i.e. having one more PR councilor, while controlling for council size. Then in the regression, the councils with Treat $=1$ effectively have one fewer ward councilor than those with Treat $=0$. Therefore, it becomes more difficult to interpret the sign of the coefficient on Treat when the outcome variable relates to ward elections, e.g. the number of female ward councilors or candidates. When the running variable is based on the number of ward councilors, however, we are free from this problem. Changing the running variable this way does not change much else. In fact, the coefficients $\hat{\psi}_{0}$ and $\hat{\psi}_{1}$ stay the same, as well as the R-squared value.

[^9]:    ${ }^{12}$ No bunching is rejected for randomly selected cutoffs of council size.

[^10]:    ${ }^{13}$ Due to the addition of the running variable in the regression, mechanically the coefficients of columns (5) and (6), as well as those of columns (9) and (10), are of opposite signs. Also mechanically, the coefficients of columns (7) and (8) add up to 1.

[^11]:    ${ }^{14} \mathrm{As}$ it can be seen in Appendix Table A2, the majority of candidates and elected councilors is affiliated with these two main parties - $54 \%$ and $83 \%$ on average, respectively - and their importance increases over time.
    ${ }^{15}$ The maximum number of ward candidates for a party is the total number of ward seats in the council, but there is no minimum.
    ${ }^{16}$ One may argue that the total number of ward candidates is a "bad control" in the regression, because it is an outcome of the treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, as the total number of ward candidates equals the sum of the number of male and female ward candidates, the controlled regression in column (4) can be simply interpreted as a "summarization" of columns (1) and (2) together; if we were to regress the number of male ward candidates while controlling for the total number of candidates, the regression coefficients would equal exactly the negative of the coefficients in column (4).

[^12]:    ${ }^{17} \mathrm{~A}$ party is considered to have a stronghold in a ward if the party wins the greatest vote share in the PR arm in the ward, and it got over 10 percentage points more vote share than the next popular party.

[^13]:    ${ }^{18}$ Even in the ward arm, voters tend to vote for the candidate from their preferred party. To see this, we first predicted the vote share of a candidate in the ward arm based on the popularity of his/her party - measured by the party's vote share in the PR arm - and the historical tendency of voters to vote more for candidates higher up on the ballot paper. The correlation between the actual vote share and the predicted one is 0.90 . /Korea-WomenParticipationinLocalGovernments/Datacleaningandanalysis/ DOFILES/ANALYSIS/1.Analysis-RDD(Jay'sversion)5(simulatedelectionresult).do

[^14]:    ${ }^{19}$ For example, Baltrunaite et al. 2014 and Bagues and Campa, 2021

[^15]:    ${ }^{20}$ There are only five parties that won or nearly won a third PR councilor, so we exclude these parties. There is no party that won four PR councilors.
    ${ }^{21}$ We do not consider the cases of the marginal candidate being third or lower on the list. It is extremely rare that a single party wins that many PR candidates, as can be seen in Appendix Table A1.

[^16]:    ${ }^{22}$ The quota placed no restrictions on the second candidate in the ballot list.

[^17]:    ${ }^{23}$ For example, the number of women a party needs to include in the party list is 1 if the number of PR seats for the municipality is 1 or 2 , and 2 if the number of PR seats is 3 or 4 .

[^18]:    ${ }^{24} \mathrm{An}$ example is when there are three PR seats in a municipality, and the rank- 1 and rank- 2 parties contest over the last seat. Let $v_{n}$ denote the vote share (among qualifying parties) received by the rank- $n$ party. Rank 1 wins if $3 v_{1}-2>3 v_{2} \Longleftrightarrow v_{1}>v_{2}+\frac{2}{3}$. Therefore, $\bar{v}$ for the rank- 1 party equals $v_{2}+\frac{2}{3}$. On the other hand, $\bar{v}$ for the rank- 2 party equals $v_{1}-\frac{2}{3}$.

